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STATE REGULATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
Following a trend initiated by Connecticut in 1946,' Missouri re-
cently became the fiftieth state to enact legislation regulating the prac-
tice of psychology.2 Like occupational licensing in general, the
regulation of psychologists is an exercise of the state's police power to
protect the public health and welfare.3 Advocates of such regulation
justify legislation regulating the practice of psychology as necessary to
protect the consumer from unskilled and incompetent practitioners.4
Critics challenge the effectiveness of occupational regulation,5 however,
!. 1945 Conn. Pub. Acts 257. See Miles, A Year of State Certijcation of Psychologists, 1
AM. PSYCH. 393 (1946). Kentucky and Virginia soon followed Connecticut's lead in the enact-
ment of legislation regulating psychologists. 1948 Ky. Acts 380; 1950 Va. Acts 990. See The Certi-
fication of Clinical Psychologists in Virginia, I AM. PSYCH. 395 (1946). See generally Note,
Regulation of Psychological Counseling and Psychotherapy, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 474 (195 1).
2. 1977 Mo. Laws 527.
3. Pitts v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 222 Md. 224, 226, 160 A.2d 200, 201
(1960). As an exercise of the state's police power, such legislation need only be reasonably related
to the exercise of such power. National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of
New York, 8 N.Y.2d 197, 168 N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298
(1960). See also Amnot., 81 A.L.R.2d 791 (1962); Comment, Regulating Medical Psychotherapists
in Illinois.- A Question of Balance, 11 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROc. 601, 625-26 (1978). Courts
have upheld the regulation of many other occupations on the basis of the state's police power. See,
e.g.. Mann v. Board of Medical Examiners, 31 Cal. 2d 30, 187 P.2d 1 (1947) (physicians); Doyle v.
Board of Barber Examiners, 291 Cal. App. 2d 504, 33 Cal. Rptr. 349 (1963) (barbers); Debruhe v.
District of Colum. Hackers' License, 384 A.2d 421 (D.C. 1978) (hackers); Brooks v. State Bd. of
Funeral Directors and Embalmers, 233 Md. 98, 195 A.2d 728 (1963) (funeral directors); Peterson
v. University of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 432, 201 N.E.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1964) (landscape
architects); Texas State Bd. of Pub. Accountancy v. Fulcher, 515 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(accountants).
4. National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of New York, 8 N.Y.2d
197, 202, 168 N.E.2d 649, 651-52, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, 825, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298 (1960);
Kayton, Statutory Regulation of Psychologists: Its Scope and Constitutionality, 33 ST. JOHN'S L.
REv. 249, 249-50 (1959). The need to protect the public from unskilled or inadequately trained
psychologists is greater than the need for consumer protection from, for example, unskilled bar-
bers, because of the difficulty the consumer encounters in ascertaining the competence of those
who pretend to be psychologists and the consumer's comparative inability to recognize when he or
she has been injured by a psychologist. Cathcart & Graff, Occupational Licensing: Factoring It
Out, 9 PAC. L.J. 147, 147 (1978). Further, the probability of a successful malpractice suit against a
negligent or incompetent psychotherapist is slight. A plaintiff faces the problems of defining the
psychotherapists' duty to the consumer, identifying the proximate cause of the injury, and assess-
ing the degree of the injury and the appropriate amount of damages. See Comment, Regulating
Medical Psychotherapists in Illinois: A Question of Balance, 11 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 601,
616-24 (1978).
5. Frieberg, The Song is Ended but the Malady Lingers On.: Legal Regulation of Psychother-
api, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J. 519, 533 (1978) (evidence lacking that regulatory statutes actually protect
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and allege that members of the occupation benefit more from regula-
tion than consumers.' Psychologists and members of the public thus
public from incompetent psychotherapists); Rogers, Some New Challenges, 28 AM. PSYCH. 379,
382 (1973) (as many certified charlatans exist as uncertified). Rogers also complains that an effect
of certification is to freeze the profession in its past image. Applicants for certification are often
required to pass an examination containing questions written ten to twenty years earlier and given
by examiners who have ten to twenty years of experience. Id.
Another concern regarding the effectiveness of occupational regulatory statutes is that they con-
tain standards for admission to the profession that are unrelated to an individual's ability to prac-
tice the profession with competence. The California legislature eliminated many requirements it
considered to be arbitrary, such as citizenship, good moral character, and age above the age of
majority. See Cathcart & Graff, OccupationalLicensing: Factoring It Out, 9 PAC. L.J. 147, 154-55
(1978).
6. Members of a profession seek licensing "always on the purported ground that licensure
protects the uninformed public against incompetence or dishonesty, but invariably with the conse-
quence that members of the licensed group become protected against competition from newcom-
ers." Gellhorn, Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 11-12 (1976). The author
observes further that:
[O]ccupational licensing has typically brought higher status for the producer of services
at the price of higher costs to the consumer, it has reduced competition; it has narrowed
opportunity for aspiring youth by increasing the costs of entry into a desired occupa-
tional career, it has artificially segmented skills so that needed services, like health care,
are increasingly difficult to supply economically; it has fostered the cynical view that
unethical practices will prevail unless those entrenched in a profession are assured of
high incomes; and it has caused a proliferation of official administrative bodies, most of
them staffed by persons drawn from and devoted to furthering the interests of the li-
censed occupations themselves.
Id. at 16-18 (footnotes omitted). See also Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 AM.
PSYCH. 1009 (1978) (licensing analogous to craft guilds); Wallace, OccupationalLicensing and Cer-
tocation: Remedies/or Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 46 (1972) (motives for licensing include
commercial advantage and enhanced professional status and prestige). But see Pfeffer, Some Evi-dence on Occupational Licensing and OccupationalIncomes, 53 Soc. FORCES 102 (1974) (no evi-
dence that licensing per se affects occupational income).
At a symposium in 1950 sponsored by the Conference of State Psychological Associations, psy-
chologists maintained that their fundamental reason for seeking licensure was protection of the
public, but admitted that self-protection was also an important consideration. This need for self-
protection is evident in a 1948 episode in the New York state legislature. A senator introduced an
amendment to the Medical Practices Act that would have required all persons to obtain a physi-
cian's license before they could diagnose or treat mental or nervous disorders. The amendment
would have essentially prohibited most clinical psychologists from practicing. The proposed
amendment died in committee, due largely to the active opposition of New York's state psycho-
logical committee. Pratment, The Problem of Protecting the Public by Appropriate Legislation/or
the Practice ofPsychology, 5 AM. PSYCH. 102, 102-03 (1950).
Other motives behind the psychologists' "surge toward professionalization" include their desire
to achieve eligibility for payment under any national health insurance program, and their need to
meet current pressures placed on all health care specialties for increased accountability and up-
grading of skills. Walsh, Professional Psychologists Seek to Change Roles and Rules in the Field,
203 SCIENCE 338, 340 (1979).
Critics of occupational licensing observe that the restriction on entry of newcomers into the
profession raises antitrust concerns. See Wallace, OccupationalLicensing and Cer/fication: Reme-
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experienced great difficulty in persuading state legislators to regulate
the practice of psychology. Their task was made more difficult because
psychology was a developing and largely undefined profession7 with
diesfor Denial, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 46, 89-108 (1972); Comment, OccupationalLicensing: An
Antitrust Analysis, 41 Mo. L. REV. 66 (1976). See also Barron, Business and Professional Licens-
ing--Calfornia. A Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640 (1966), acknowledging that re-
striction of individual freedom to enter an occupation constitutes a monopolistic restriction on the
operation of a free market and consequently increases consumer prices. Barron asserts, however,
that "licensing is economically justified if the burden of higher prices is less than the social costs
that would arise from damage to the public health, safety, welfare, or morals that would occur in
the absence of licensing." Id. at 643. The author further maintains that occupations are licensed
to insure that consumers can choose between competent sellers in the licensed profession, not to
decrease the number of sellers. Id.
See generally Note, Occupational Licensing: An Argument ofAsserting State Control, 44 NOTRE
DAME LAW 104, 109 (1968) (summary of criticisms of state occupational licensing).
7. Because "psychology" could not be clearly defined, early proponents of psychologist reg-
ulation often disagreed about who should be regulated. Psychologists differed on whether states
should require all psychologists, including "academic" or "experimental" psychologists, to obtain
a license, or whether licensure only of "professional" or "clinical" psychologists would adequately
protect the public. See Krech, A Note on Fission, I AM. PSYCH. 402, 402 (1946).
Psychologists also debated whether specialty licensing should exist for the various branches of
applied psychology as distinguished, for example, from clinical, personnel, and counseling psy-
chologists, or generic licensure of all psychologists. Proponents of specialty licensing argue that it
offers maximum assurance against malpractice; opponents are concerned with the problems of
enforcing specialty licensing, as well as the danger of splitting psychology into splintered groups.
See Heiser, The Needfor Legislation and the Complexity of Problem, 5 AM. PSYCH. 104, 104, 108
(1950); Wendt, Legislationfor the General Practice of Psycholog
, 
Versus Legislationfor Specialties
within Psychologv; 5 AM. PSYCH. 107, 107-08 (1950). As an alternative to specialty licensing, some
psychologists advocate uniform licensing for professional psychologists holding a doctorate in
psychology, and separate licensure for "psychological technicians" possessing a masters degree.
See Kelly, Single Level Versus Legislationfor Different Levels of Psychological Training and Expe-
rience, 5 AM. PSYCH. 109, 109 & 111 (1950); Wolfe, Legal Control ofPsychologicalPractice, 5 AM.
PSYCH. 651, 652-53 (1950).
The divergence between academic and professional psychologists persists today. Professional
psychologists have gained strength because job availability for clinical psychologists has grown
while the marketplace for academic psychologists has dwindled. Academic psychologists no
longer dominate the American Psychological Association; increasing numbers of clinical psychol-
ogists have become members and officers. The two groups continue to disagree about the scope of
licensing laws. Academic psychologists argue against being required to obtain a license primarily
designed for practitioners. Academic psychologists may have off-campus consultations, however,
and professional psychologists insist they be required to meet licensing standards. See Walsh,
Professional Psychologists Seek to Change Rules in the Field, 203 SCIENCE 338, 339-40 (1979).
Evidence supports a trend toward regulation of private practitioners alone. The American Psy-
chological Association Board of Directors recently proposed guidelines for state legislation that
would apply only to psychologists providing "direct ameliorative services." Foltz, Sun Sets on
Psychology Licensing Boards in South Dakota and Florida, APA MONITOR 3, 14 (Sept./Oct. 1979).
For futher discussion of the scope of psychologist licensing laws, see notes 82-110 infra and ac-
companying text.
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uncertain professional standards.8 Eventually state legislatures
adopted legislation to regulate the practice of psychology. This legisla-
tion assumes the form of either certification laws9 or licensure laws.10
8. In 1953 the American Psychological Association Committee on a Directory of Psycholog-
ical Service Centers and the American Board of Psychological Services issued guidelines for ap-
propriate standards for psychologists that influenced states enacting licensing and certification
laws in the 1950s and 1960s. The American Psychological Association continues to be active in
this respect. In 1970 it established a Task Force on Standards for Psychologists, which recom-
mends standards for psychological services in all settings, and in 1975 the American Psychological
Association Council created a Standing Committee on Standards for Providers of Psychological
Services and charged it with continually reviewing and revising standards. See W. VAN HoosE &
J. KoTrLER, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES IN COUNSELING AND PSYCHOTHERAPY 111-13 (1977).
Psychologists in New York encountered additional obstacles to obtaining a licensurc statute.
Psychiatrists, fearing encroachment on their professional territory, enlisted the support of the
Medical Society of the State of New York, the American Psychiatric Association, and the Ameri-
can Medical Association to oppose proposed psychology licensing laws. In 1951 Governor Dewey
vetoed the New York Psychologist licensing bill, in part because of the objections of the medical
organizations. See Comment, The 4merican MedicalAssociation: Power, Purpose, and Politics in
Organized Medicine, 63 YALE L.J. 938, 968-69 (1954). New York finally enacted a psychologist
licensing law in 1956. 1956 N.Y. Laws 1626.
9. Certification laws simply restrict the use of a professional title to certified practitioners.
See VAN HOOSE & KOTrLER, supra note 8, at 121. For examples of certification laws see MD.
ANN. CODE art. 43, §§ 618-644 (1971); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 148.79-.86 (West 1970); N.Y. EDUC.
LAW §§ 7600-7605 (McKinney 1972); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 18.83.010-.900 (1978). The Maryland
psychologist certification statute survived judicial review in Pitts v. State Bd. of Examiners of
Psychologists, 222 Md. 224, 160 A.2d 200 (1960). Plaintiffs alleged that the act, by merely restrict-
ing use of the words "psychological," "psychologists," and "psychology," failed to prevent incom-
petent persons from continuing their practice and inadequately protected the public. The act's
restrictions, therefore, were arbitrary and unreasonable and violative of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 226-27, 160 A.2d at 201. The court held that the act is constitu-
tional on the basis that it is within the scope of the state's police power and is rationally related to
a legitimate public interest. Because the act represents a step in the direction of public protection,
the court refused to question the adequacy of the legislative scheme. Id. at 226-27, 160 A.2d at
201-02. The court further noted that certification statutes were validly employed in Maryland
with regard to midwives, architects, registered nurses, licensed practical nurses, registered plumb-
ers, and certified public accountants. Id. at 228, 160 A.2d at 202. The court in National Psycho-
logical Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of New York accepted the same argument in up-
holding the New York psychologist certification act, reasoning that "if the act is a step in the
iirection of something which will enure to the public health and comfort, that it does not go as far
as it might, is not a reason for invalidating it." 8 N.Y.2d 197, 202-03, 168 N.E.2d 649, 652, 203
N.Y.S.2d 821, 825, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298 (1960) (quoting People ex rel. Nechamcus v.
Warden of City Prison, 144 N.Y. 529, 538-39, 39 N.E. 686, 689 (1895)).
Commentators maintain that there is a third type of statute regulating psychotherapists called
the conjunctive statute, which is a combination of certification and licensure statutes. Frieburg,
The Song is Ended but the Malady Lingers On: Legal Regulation of Psychotherapy, 22 ST. Louis
U.L.J. 519, 530 (1978). See Kayton, Statutory Regulation ofPsychologists," Its Scope and Constitu-
tionality, 33 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 249, 251-52 (1959) (includes New York among states with con-
junctive statutes). But Sf National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of New
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Persons seeking to obtain or retain a license to practice psychology
challenge psychologist licensing laws on several grounds." Certain
groups challenge the scope of licensing statutes.' 2  Others question
whether the statutes unlawfully delegate legislative power to adminis-
trative agencies.' 3  Other challenges focus on due process concerns,
such as specificity and clarity of statutory terms, 14 procedural fairness
in licensing and license revocation,' 5 and stringency of grandfather li-
censing requirements. 6
This Note will examine Missouri's psychologist licensing act and
compare it with laws regulating psychologists in other states. First, it
examines the administration of the Missouri statute. The Note then
focuses on issues arising from implementation of psychologist licensure
or certification laws in Missouri and other states. Finally, the Note ex-
amines possible problems and issues that may confront state regulation
of psychologists in the future.
I. ADMINISTRATION OF THE MISSOURI PSYCHOLOGIST
LICENSING ACT
The Missouri psychologist licensing statute, enacted in 1977, ' 7 ap-
York, 8 N.Y.2d 197, 200, 168 N.E.2d 649, 651, 203 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S.
298 (1960) (identifies New York's statute as a certification law).
10. Licensure laws prohibit the practice of an occupation by unlicensed persons. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE §§ 34-26-I to -48 (1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2900-2996 (Deering 1975); Mo.
REv. STAT. §§ 337.010-070 (1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1351-1375 (West 1971). An early
concern with regulating psychologists through licensing laws was that "activities which the psy-
chologist is carrying on in the practice of psychology have not ... yet been defined to the point
where a state law can be enacted saying that these activities may be carried on only by a person
who has the license of a psychologist." Saffir, Certification Versus Licensing Legislation, 5 AM.
PSYCH. 105, 106 (1950). For this reason commentators urged that licensing laws be kept flexible,
avoiding a specific delineation of psychological activities. See Note, Regulation of Psychological
Counseling and Psychotherapy, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 474, 495 (1951).
11. See notes 46-119 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 80-108 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 109-119 infra and accompanying text.
14. See notes 46-61 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 62-79 infra and accompanying text.
16. A grandfather clause permits individuals engaged in the practice of a newly regulated
profession at the time of regulation to obtain a license or certificate without fulfilling all of the
statutory requirements placed on future licensees. Taylor v. Hayes, 131 Ill. App. 2d 305, 309, 264
N.E.2d 814, 816 (1970). See notes 144-69 infra and accompanying text.
17. 1977 Mo. Laws 527. The licensing bill was introduced in the House of Representatives
on January 5, 1977. H.B. 255, 79th General Assembly, Ist Sess. (1977). The bill was described as
"lain Act relating to a state committee of psychologist examiners to register and regulate the prac-
tice of psychology, with penalty provisions," and its stated purpose was to create a "State Commit-
Washington University Open Scholarship
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plies to any individual who "holds himself out to the public by any title
or description of services incorporating the words 'psychology', 'psy-
chological', or 'psychologist', and offers to render or renders psycholog-
ical services. . . for a fee ... ."I8 The statute provides for the creation
of a State Committee of Psychologists (the Committee) as an adjunct to
the State Board of Registration of the Healing Arts 9 (the Board). The
Board is assigned to the Division of Professional Registration20 in the
Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation, and Licensing2 (the De-
tee of Psychologist Examiners" that would function as an adjunct to the State Board of
Registration for the Healing Arts. Id. The Senate Committee substitute for House Bill No. 255,
passed by the House of Representatives on June 15, 1977, became Missouri's psychologist licens-
ing law. S.C.S. for H.B. 255, 79th General Assembly, Ist Sess. (1977).
18. Mo. REv. STAT. § 337.015(2) (1978). Psychological services involve:
the application of principles, methods, and procedures of understanding, predicting, and
influencing behavior such as the'principles pertaining to learning, perception, motiva-
tion, thinking, emotions, and interpersonal relationships; the methods and procedures of
interviewing, counseling, behavior modification, and psychotherapy; of constructing, ad-
ministering, and interpreting tests of mental abilities, aptitudes, interests, attitudes, per-
sonality characteristics, emotion, and motivation; and of assessing public opinion.
Id. § 337.015(3). The statute further provides that:
The application of these principles and methods includes, but is not restricted to: di-
agnosis, prevention, treatment, and amelioration of adjustment problems and emotional
and mental disturbances of individuals and groups; hypnosis; educational and vocational
counseling; personnel selection and management; the evaluation and planning for effec-
tive work and learning situations; advertising and market research; and the resolution of
interpersonal and social conflicts.
Id. § 337.015(4). This description of psychological activity is significantly more detailed than that
found in most other state psychology statutes. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2061 (Supp.
1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 619(c) (1980); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.81 (West 1970); N.Y.
EDUC. LAW § 7601 (McKinney 1972). Statutes that define the practice of psychology almost as
extensively as Missouri's include CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2903 (Deering Supp. 1979); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 12-43-102 (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3101 (1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 1352 (West 1971).
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 337.050(1) (1978). The Board was established "for the purpose of reg-
istering, licensing, and supervising all physicians and surgeons, and midwives in this state." Id.
§ 334.120. The governor appoints the seven Board members; five must be graduates of accredited
medical schools and two must be graduates of accredited schools of osteopathy. Id. House Bill
No. 255 provided that the Committee chairman must be an ex officio member of the state Board of
Registration of Healing Arts to participate in deliberations on all matters concerning psychology.
H.B. 255 § 2(7), 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1977). The statute does not include such a
provision.
20. See Reorganization Act of 1974, § 4(15)-(16), app. B. at 4799 (1978).
21. The Missouri Constitution provides that:
The department of consumer affairs, regulation and licensing, shall be in charge of a
director appointed by the governor, by and with the advice and consent of the senate,
The department shall administer all programs provided by law relating to the promotion
of the economy of the state and its citizens and to the protection and improvement of the
human rights, interests, and well-being of the people of the state.
Mo. CONsT. art. 4, § 36(a).
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partment).
The Committee consists of five psychologists22 appointed by the di-
rector of the Department. 23 In conjunction with the Board, the Com-
mittee guides, advises, and makes recommendations to the
Department.24 Committee members must represent diverse areas of
psychology25 and, except for members of the initial Committee, be li-
censed according to the Missouri licensing act.26
22. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(1) (1978). Compare ALA. CODE § 34-26-21 (1977) (five mem-
bers of Board of Examiners in psychology, all psychologists) and GA. CODE ANN. § 84-102 (1979)
(five members of State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, all psychologists) and ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 11 I, § 5308 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (five members of Psychologists Examining Committee,
all psychologists) and MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 621 (1980) (five members of State Board of
Examiners of Psychologists, all psychologists) and N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7602 (McKinney 1972)
(eleven members of State Board of Psychologists, all psychologists) and OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 1354 (West Supp. 1979) (five members of State Board of Examiners of Psychologists, all psy-
chologists) with CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2920-2922 (Deering Supp. 1980) (eight members of
Psychology Examining Committee, three members of the public) and COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-
103(3) (1973) (nine members of State Board of Psychologist Examiners, one a layman) andCoNN.
GEN. STAT. § 20-186 (1979) (five members of Board of Examiners of Psychologists, two members
of the public) and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 319.020 (Baldwin 1979) (five members of State Board
of Examiners of Psychologists, one a citizen at large). Members of the licensed profession serve on
licensing boards because their expertise enables them to judge the competence of applicants for
licensure. Critics, however, question the fairness and effectiveness of licensing boards composed
exclusively of members of the licensed profession. Such boards are naturally inclined to serve
their own, rather than the public, interests. Barron, Business & ProfessionalLicensing--California,
.4 Representative Example, 18 STAN. L. REV. 640, 649-50 (1966). Barron suggests that licensing
boards be composed of nonmembers of the profession being licensed and members of the licensed
profession who are employees of the state. Id. at 665. See also VAN HOOSE & KOTrLER supra
note 8. at 101; Gross, The Myth of Professional Licensing, 33 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1013 (1978). See
text accompanying note 81 infra.
23. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(1) (1978). House Bill No. 255 provided that the governor
would appoint Committee members. H.B. 255 § 2(1), 79th General Assembly, Ist Sess. (1977).
There is wide variation among states as to which state official makes the appointments.
24. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(1) (1978).
25. Id. § 337.050(2). At least two members must be primarily engaged in teaching, training,
or research in psychology; one employed full time as a teacher at a recognized college or univer-
sity, and at least two members must be primarily engaged in rendering services in psychology for
at least five years before appointment, one employed at least eighty percent of the time in private
practice of counseling or psychotherapy.
The Missouri legislature was relatively specific in requiring that Committee members possess
diverse psychological practices. Other state legislatures have evinced a similar interest in board
member diversity. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-21 (1977); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2922
(Deering Supp. 1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-103(3) (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3102 (Supp.
1980). ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I 11, § 5308 (Smith-Hurd 1978); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 622 (1980);
VA. CODE § 54-937 (1978). But see ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.010 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-186
(1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 319.020 (Baldwin 1979); N.Y. EDUC. LAWS § 7602 (McKinney
1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1354-1355 (West Supp. 1979 & West 1971).
26. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(2) (1978). Members of the first Committee serve for staggered
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The Department adopts rules governing the Committee's conduct
and enables it to function and effectuate the purposes of the statute;27
any rule, regulation, or advisory opinion issued by the Department or
Committee expires two years after its promulgation.2 Additional du-
ties of the Department include offering a biannual examination for li-
censure applicants, 29 and licensing and initially registering as a
psychologist any applicant who fulfills the statutory licensure require-
ments30 and passes the examination. 3' The Department must license
without examination applicants who fulfill the requirements of the
grandfather clause.32 The Department is also responsible for annual
terms of one, two, three, four, and five years; succeeding Committee members are appointed for
terms of five years. The maximum length of time any member can serve on the Committee is ten
years. Id. § 337.050(1). Committee members are not compensated for performance of their offi-
cial duties, but they can be reimbursed for expenses incurred. Id. § 337.050(4). House Bill No.
225 provided Committee members with compensation of $25 for each day employed in perform-
ance of official duties, as well as reimbursement for expenses. H.B. 255 § 2(4), 79th General As-
sembly, 1st Sess. (1977). States vary in their compensation of committee or board members. Some
states reimburse members only for expenses incurred while performing committee business. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-21 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5308 (Smith-Hurd 1978); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 319.020 (Baldwin 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, §§ 1354-1355 (West Supp. 1979
& West 1971). Other states grant a per diem allowance in addition to expense reimbursement,
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2935 (Deering 1975) ($25 per diem); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-
43-103(7) (1978) ($30 per diem); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3105 (1979) ($15 per diem); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 623 (1980) (per diem allowance as provided in budget). Finally, some statutes
make no provision for committee member compensation. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-186
to -195 (1979); N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 7602 (McKinney 1972); VA. CODE §§ 54-936 to -940 (1978).
27. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(5) (1978). The director of the Department, through the direc-
tor of the Division of Professional Registration, will provide all staff for the Committee. Id.
§ 337.050(4). Further, the Department director may remove Committee members for misconduct,
inefficiency, incompetency, or neglect of office. Id. § 337.050(6).
28. Id. § 337.050(7). Rules, regulations, advisory opinions, or amendments can be effective
beyond their two year expiration date if both houses of the General Assembly and the governor
approve them. Id. Authority to issue the same terminates on November 30, 1981. Id.
§ 337.050(8). These provisions did not exist in House Bill No. 255, and are unique to Missouri's
psychologist licensing act.
29. Id. § 337.020(3). Part of the examination must be written; the Department may supple-
ment this with an oral examination as it deems necessary. The examination must cover "areas of
professional knowledge, techniques and applications, research and its interpretation and profes-
sional affairs and ethics." Id.
30. Id. § 337.020(2). For a discussion of statutory requirements for licensure, see notes 47-49
infra and accompanying text.
31. Id. § 337.020(3). All psychologist licensing laws require that licensure applicants pass an
examination. Missouri applicants who fail the examination may take it again upon payment of a
$75 nonrefundable fee. Id. § 337.020(4).
32. An applicant seeking grandfather licensure must apply within six months of the date the
statute became effective, prove that he or she was actively practicing psychology for the past two
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registration of licensed psychologists33 and must discipline licensees
who behave in an unethical or unprofessional manner.34
Missouri's first State Committee of Psychologists was formed in late
1977. Its initial task was to review applications from approximately
968 candidates for grandfather licensing.35 To facilitate the Commit-
tee's determination of which applicants should be recommended for
licensure, the Committee advised the Department to promulgate spe-
cific rules and regulations. The rules established Committee proce-
dure,36 clarified requirements for licensure under the grandfather
clause 37 and more precisely defined the educational38 and professional
years, and otherwise meet the statutory requirements. Id. § 337.020(5). See notes 137-57 infra
and accompanying text.
33. d. § 337.030. Before July 1 of each year, licensed psychologists must register their home
and business addresses with the Department, along with any other information relating to the
practice of psychology required by the Department, and must pay a $40 annual registration fee.
Id. § 337.030(1). The statute provides a penalty for late registration and a replacement fee for
lost, mutilated, or destroyed certificates. .d. § 337.030(2)-(3).
34. Id. § 337.035. See notes 62-67 infra and accompanying text.
35. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 1, 1979, at 4B, col. 2.
36. 4 C.S.R. 235-1.010 (1977). State Committee of Psychologists, provides for selection of the
Committee chairperson and secretary, and for disclosure of Committee records and decisions to
the Board of Registration for the Healing Arts and the Department. The purpose of the Rule was
to comply with Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(5) (1978) authorizing the Department to promulgate
rules governing the Committee's conduct.
37. 4 C.S.R. 235-4.010 (1977), Requirements for Licensure Without Examination, provides
that:
Any person who on or prior to March 28, 1978 files with the Department evidence satis-
factory to the department that for at least two years preceding his application he has
been a resident of or principally employed in Missouri and has been engaged in the
active profession of psychology and who fulfills the requirements of subsections 1 and 2
of section 337.020 RSMo. . . by means of such evidence as is required by 4 C.S.R. 235-
2.010 and -3.010 shall be licensed and registered as a psychologist without an examina-
tion.
Id. The purpose of the Rule was to comply with Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020(5) directing the De-
partment to license qualified applicants without examination under a grandfather provision.
38. 4 C.S.R. 235-3.010 (1977), Educational Requirements, describes a program of study
which is "primarily psychological." Section one provides that the holder of a doctoral degree in
psychology or in a program whose content was primarily psychological in nature must provide
evidence that at least 50% of his or her course work was in psychology and that he or she had one
year of internship training prior to receipt of the degree. The applicant must have completed 40
graduate semester hours or 60 graduate quarter hours of work in psychology, with at least 24
semester or 36 quarter hours in at least 15 areas of psychology (experimental, developmental,
individual differences, psychological tests and measurements, social, statistics, history and sys-
tems, experimental design, personality theory, learning, physiological, abnormal, comparative,
motivation, and perception). The applicant can supplement his or her transcript with catalogue
descriptions and/or course syllabi. To aid in determining whether a course is psychological in
nature, the Committee will examine the psychological content of the course and the psychological
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experience 39 requirements for licensure. The Committee then ex-
amined each application to determine if the candidate fulfilled the stat-
utory and regulatory requirements for licensure4
qualifications of the instructor. The applicant has the burden of proving that his or her course
work was the equivalent of course work in psychology; it is within the Department's discretion to
make a final determination of the nature of the course work.
Section two specifies the educational requirements of a person holding a master's degree and is
identical to section one, except that the master's degree applicant must have completed at least 30
graduate semester hours or 45 graduate quarter hours of work in psychology, and at least 24
semester or 36 quarter hours must have been in five basic areas of psychology, drawn from the 15
areas listed in section one. No internship is required of master's degree applicants.
The purpose of the Rule was to comply with Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020(2)(2)-(b) (1978) requir-
ing that applicants for licensure have a graduate degree in a "program of studies whose content
was primarily psychological." The Educational Requirements Rule was subsequently repealed.
See notes 125-29 infra and accompanying text explaining the circumstances surrounding the re-
peal.
In promulgating this rule, the Committee was concerned with reflecting legislative intent to
create a generic licensing law for psychologists, rather than licensing for particular psychology
specialties. The Committee adopted the belief that there is a basic or core body of knowledge in
psychology essential for competent professional practice as a psychologist. Like Missouri's Edu-
cational Requirements Rule, the American Association of State Psychology Board guidelines re-
quire psychologists to be educated in several areas of psychology to be eligible for licensure. The
Association has recommended a graduate curriculum for a degree in professional psychology that
includes courses in scientific and professional ethics and standards, history and systems, research
design and methodology, and statistics and psychometrics, as well as at least six graduate hours or
nine graduate quarter hours in each of the following four areas: (1) biological bases for behavior;
(2) cognitive-affective bases of behavior; (3) social bases of behavior; and (4) individual differ-
ences. See Toward a Definition of Training in Psychology, guide lines adopted by the American
Association of State Psychology Boards at its annual meeting (Aug. 25, 1977) (representing the
Association's official position regarding criteria used to identify and designate education programs
as psychology programs). See also AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF STATE PSYCHOLOGY BOARDS,
HANDBOOK FOR MEMBERS OF STATE PSYCHOLOGY BOARDS, G-1 to -38 (2d ed. 1976) (hereinafter
cited as HANDBOOK).
39. 4 C.S.R. 235-2.010, Supervised Professional Experience, describes "satisfactory super-
vised professional experience in the general field of psychology," to entail post-graduate degree
"training or practice of psychology obtained in an organized health service training program or its
equivalent under the supervision of a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist, or one who, at the time of
supervision, would have been eligible for licensure if such supervised experience took place prior
to September 28, 1977." The rule specifies that the applicant's activities must have been per-
formed under the supervisor's orders, control, and responsibility; the applicant's reports must have
been cosigned by the supervisor, the supervisor must be a staff member or consultant to the orga-
nized health iervice training program. . . and must certify to the Department that the applicant
complied with these requirements. The purpose of the rule was to comply with Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 337.020(2) (1978) requiring the Department to determine what constitutes "satisfactory super-
vised professional experience in the general field of psychology .... " Id.
40. Much of the review by grandfather applicants centered on whether their programs of
study fulfilled the educational requirements specified in the Rule. The Committee considered
transcripts that indicated the department in which the applicant's courses were taught and often
listed the instructor's names, as well as any supplementary information the applicant provided,
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In general, the Committee concluded that an applicant possessing a
counseling degree from a department of education failed to fulfill the
requirements for licensure provided in the Educational Requirements
Rule.4 ' The Committee found that the content of counseling courses
was not primarily psychological and that counselors had not received
what the Committee deemed to be a sufficiently broad background in
different areas of psychology.42 In accordance with Committee recom-
mendations, the Department granted approximately 670 licenses.43
The Committee notified each candidate by letter of the result of his
or her application for licensure." If the applicants desired further re-
such as course syllabi, catalogue descriptions of course content and purpose, and the text used.
After thoroughly examining each applicant's program of study, the Committee tallied the total
number of hours of course work that were primarily psychological and the number of hours in
each of the core areas specified in the Educational Requirements Rule.
41. The Committee scrutinized applications from candidates holding counselor degrees in
the same manner as all other applications, but also considered whether the applicant's counseling
program was in fact a counseling psychology program, a program that is often housed in depart-
ments of education; whether the program was accredited by the American Psychological Associa-
tion as a counseling psychology program; and whether the applicant studied in a psychology
department, thereby receiving training in the core areas of psychology.
42. The Committee believed that, although counseling courses may involve the teaching of
some psychological principles, they are substantially more related to counseling than to psychol-
ogy See notes 96-108 infra and accompanying text for discussion of the counseling/psychology
distinction.
43. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 1, 1979, at 4B, col. 2. The Committee's task in reviewing
close to 1,000 applications was awesome, and several logistical obstacles impeded its progress.
Not only did members need to become internally acquainted with each others' outlooks and back-
grounds in order to establish comfortable working relationships, but the Committee as a whole
needed to ascertain its position in the bureaucratic hierarchy, especially in terms of its relationship
to the Department and the Board. Funding was a persistent problem. Further, the Committee's
concern with fairness caused it to process each application with painstaking thoroughness; if an
application was unclear and members disagreed on its meaning, the Committee requested more
information from the applicant, which consumed additional time and money.
Many of the Committee's difficulties appear to be typical of new professional licensing boards.
The new board member is accustomed to working in a professional or academic sphere, but his or
her exposure to the legal/regulatory domain is usually limited, and he or she must learn to func-
tion properly and effectively in this foreign environment. See HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at A-1
to -2. The HANDBOOK provides guidelines for psychology licensing boards. It stresses the impor-
tance of promulgating rules and regulations that delineate criteria for licensure in terms of educa-
tion and experience; such specificity is necessary in case the board faces a court challenge to its
application-review procedures. Id. at G-10 to -20.
See generaly Wolfe, Legal Control of Psychological Practice, 5 AM. PSYCH. 651, 653 (1950)
(psychology boards should be fairly liberal in granting certificates to grandfather applications but
must remember their primary responsibility is to protect the public, and must therefore scrutinize
grandfather applicants to determine that they meet established standards for competence).
44. If the Committee found that an applicant failed to meet the threshhold educational re-
quirements, the denial letter specified only this reason for nonlicensure and no other areas in
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view of their application, the letter advised them to seek informal re-
view through the Committee or formal review through the
Administrative Hearing Commission within thirty days of receipt of
the denial notice. The Administrative Hearing Commission was inun-
dated with requests for review. Its treatment of requests for review is
examined below.45
II. CHALLENGES TO PSYCHOLOGIST LICENSING ACTS
Psychologist licensing acts in many states describe the requirements
for licensure in terms of "satisfactory professional experience" and
"primarily psychological" courses of study.4 6 Section 337.020 of the
Missouri Statutes requires that all applicants complete "at least one
year of satisfactory supervised professional experience in the general
field of psychology, as determined by the department"47 and possess
either a doctoral or master's degree, "based on a program of studies
whose content was primarily psychological, from a recognized educa-
tional institution. '48 In addition, applicants with master's degrees must
which the applicant was deficient. This practice contradicted the advice of the American Associa-
tion of State Psychology Boards, which suggests that rejection letters include all reasons for license
or certificate denial. It warns that the licensing board will not be permitted to introduce reasons
for rejection not named in the denial letter, in the event of formal appeal. See HANDBOOK, suvra
note 38, at G-21.
45. See notes 128-36 infra and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-41 (1975) (applicant may have doctoral degree in field
closely allied to psychology if the training is "substantially similar" to training received in a psy-
chology department); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2914 (Deering Supp. 1980) (applicant's doctor-
ate may be one "deemed equivalent" by the committee to a degree in psychology; his professional
experience could have received "alternative supervision as determined by the committee"); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 12-43-109 (1973) (applicant's doctoral degree may be in psychology or "equivalent
to such major as determined by the board"; postdoctoral experience must be "under supervision
approved by the board"); KAN. STAT. § 74-5310 (1972) (applicant must possess a doctorate "based
on a program of studies in content primarily psychological"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1362(a)
(West 1971) (applicant's doctoral degree must be based on "program of studies with content that
was primarily psychological. . . or its substantial equivalent in both subject matter and extent of
training" and he or she must have "at least two years of satisfactory experience in rendering
psychological services").
47. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020(2) (1978).
48. Id. § 337.010(2)(a)-(b). Only three other states permit psychologists licensure with less
than a doctoral degree. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 154B.6(l) (West Supp. 1980-81); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1206(2) (Purdon 1979-80); W. VA. CODE § 30-21-7(3) (1980). House Bill No. 255 re-
quired a doctoral degree plus one year of supervised professional experience in the general field of
psychology. H.B. 255 § 3(2)(3), 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1977). The Senate Committee
Substitute for House Bill No. 255 liberalized the requirements to include a master's degree. S.C.S.
for H.B. 255 § 3(2)(b), 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1977).
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have three years of "satisfactory" professional experience.49
Licensing statutes in several states have been challenged on the basis
that licensing requirements are unconstitutionally vague and violate
the applicants' due process of law.5" A North Carolina court rejected a
vagueness challenge to that state's psychologist licensing act.5' The act
required applicants to possess a "doctoral degree based on a program
of studies the content of which was primarily psychological. . . and at
least two years of acceptable and appropriate professional experience
as a psychologist."52 The court found that these requirements enabled
the State Board of Examiners of Practicing Psychologists when review-
ing applicants for licensure to apply objective standards rationally re-
lated to the act's purposes. The North Carolina court concluded that
the psychologist licensing requirements were not vague and uncertain
enough to deprive applicants of their due process rights.53
Similarly, in Cohen v. State54 an Arizona court appeared uncon-
cerned with potential vagueness in the provisions of the Arizona psy-
chologist certification act that required applicants to possess a doctorate
"based on a program of studies the content of which was primarily
psychological, or the substantial equivalent thereof in both subject mat-
ter and extent of training" and pass a credentials examination.55 The
court's concern lay instead with the statutory provision permitting cer-
tification of applicants without examination if the applicants met cer-
tain educational requirements and possessed three years of
49. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020(2)(b) (1978). All post-grandfather applicants must also pass
the Department administered examination. Id. § 337.020(3). See note 29 supra and accompany-
ing text. Applicants must also pay a nonrefundable $75 application fee, id. § 337.020(1), and must
be at least 21 years of age and of good moral character. Id. § 337.020(2). The Missouri act also
provides for licensure of psychologists licensed or certified by another state. The other state's
licensing or certification requirements must be "substantially equal" to the Missouri requirements
and the other state must extend privileges to psychologists like those granted in Missouri. Id.
§ 337.020(2)(c).
50. See Note, Due Process Limitations on OccupationalLicensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097, 1103-
04 (1973) (due process requires that standards used by licensing boards be intelligible and reason-
ably related to ability to practice competently).
51. See In re Partin, 37 N.C. App. 302, 246 S.E.2d 519 (1978).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.1 l(a)(1)(c) (Supp. 1979).
53. In re Partin, 37 N.C. App. 302, 310, 246 S.E.2d 519, 524-25 (1978). The North Carolina
legislature amended its psychologist licensing act in 1977. It now requires that applicants possess
a "doctoral degree based on a planned and directed program of studies, the content of which was
psychological in nature," and the two years of post-doctoral experience must be "germane to his
area of practice as a psychologist." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.11 (a)(1)(c) (Supp. 1979).
54. 121 Ariz. App. 20, 588 P.2d 313 (1977), modfted, 121 Ariz. 6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978).
55. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2071(l)(c) & (3) (1976, amended 1978).
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"professional experience satisfactory to the board. '56 The Arizona
court found these academic requirements for certification unconstitu-
tionally uncertain and ambiguous and ruled that the statute denied
professionally experienced applicants due process of law.
A New York court held that the New York psychologist certification
act's failure to define "psychology" did not constitute a violation of due
process.5 8 The court noted that the legislature had tried and failed to
define "psychology" in a way that sufficiently delineated the nature and
scope of the profession.5 9 The qualifications for certification, however,
imbued the term "psychologist" with meaning.60 Further, the statute's
56. Id. § 32-2072(D). The educational requirements for the applicant with three years' expe-
rience are possession of a doctorate "or equivalent thereof. . . based on a program of studies the
content of which is primarily psychological, or the substantial equivalent thereof in both subject
matter and extent of training. ... Id. Plaintiff possessed a master's degree in psychology and a
doctorate in social science. He also had over 25 years of professional experience in psychology.
Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. App. 20, 22, 25 n.3, 588 P.2d 313, 315, 318 n.3 (1977), modifled, 121 Ariz.
6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978).
57. Both the Arizona Court of Appeals and the State Supreme Court observed that the stat-
ute provided two avenues to certification: a purely academic one for inexperienced applicants,
and one that is both academic and professional. The courts considered it unreasonable to require
applicants with at least three years of experience to have the same academic credentials as those
without experience. But the intent of the legislators was uncertain, and the statute appeared to
require similarity of training. In this sense the provisions were deemed vague and ambiguous and
made "certification uncertain and speculative for an applicant having three years of professional
experience and, thus denield] him due process of law." Cohen v. State, 121 Ariz. App, 20, 25, 588
P.2d 313, 318 (1977) modfled, 121 Ariz. 6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978). The court of appeals held that
only the portions of the provisions concerning certification without examination and the creden-
tials examination were unconstitutional. Id. at 26, 588 P.2d at 319. The supreme court held that
entire sections (§ 32-2071 and § 32-2072) had to be declared unconstitutional because the constitu-
tional portions could not be severed from the unconstitutional ones. 121 Ariz. at 9, 588 P.2d at
302. Because these sections had been amended after Cohen initially applied for certification, the
court ordered Cohen to reapply in accordance with the amended statute. d. at 10, 588 P.2d at
303. The statute now provides that applicants must possess a "doctoral degree, the content of
which was primarily psychological. ... ARZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2071(l)(b) (Supp. 1979-
80). There is no longer a provision for waiver of the examination for applicants with professional
experience. Id. § 32-2072.
58. See National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of New York, 8
N.Y.2d 197, 168 N.E.2d 649, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298 (1960).
59. Id. at 203, 168 N.E.2d at 652, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 826.
60. Id. at 203, 168 N.E.2d at 652-53, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 826. The statute provided that an
applicant must be at least 21 years of age and of good moral character, pay a fee, pass an examina-
tion, possess a "doctoral degree based on a program of studies whose content was primarily psy-
chological from an educational institution having a graduate program registered by the
department, or its substantial equivalent in both subject matter and extent of training," and have
"at least two years of satisfactory supervised experience in rendering psychological services,"
N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 7605 (Consol. 1956), construed in National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoa-
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failure to define "psychology" was unimportant because enforcement
of the statute did not depend on interpretations of the term. The re-
quirement that a criminal statute be specific to give fair notice was sat-
isfied because individuals could easily comply with the statute by
avoiding the use of particular words. Uncertified persons can offer or
render services of a psychological nature without violating the statute
provided that they do not use the word "psychology" or its deriva-
tives.6 '
In light of the findings of the North Carolina, Arizona, and New
York courts, the Missouri statute's use of the terms "primarily psycho-
logical" and "satisfactory supervised professional experience" to de-
scribe requirements for psychologist licensure appear safe from
successful due process and vagueness challenges. Rules by the licens-
ing board clarifying the statutory licensing requirements make even
more remote the possibility of future challenges to the Missouri statute
on the basis of vagueness.
Occupational regulation in general and psychologist licensing acts in
particular, present the additional due process concern of procedural
fairness in granting and revoking licenses. The Missouri Department
of Consumer Affairs, Regulation, and Licensing, in addition to its con-
trol over the issuance of licenses, has broad regulatory power over the
conduct of licensed psychologists.62 The Missouri statute provides the
Department with authority to refuse, withhold, deny, suspend, or re-
voke a license upon proof that the applicant used narcotics or alcoholic
beverages to such an extent that his ability to work was impaired; ob-
nalysis v. University of New York, 8 N.Y.2d 197, 201, 168 N.E.2d 649, 651, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824,
appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 298 (1960).
The court characterized plaintiff's complaint as centered more on the qualifications the legisla-
ture adopted than on the absence of a formal definition of "psychology." The board refused to
accept plaintiff's psychologist training program as satisfying the statute's academic requirements,
and plaintiff was aggrieved by this. The court maintained that a disagreement with legislative
judgment as to standards of fitness for certification cannot achieve the level of a constitutional
argument merely by describing it in terms of due process. Id. at 205, 168 N.E.2d at 653-54, 203
N.Y.S.2d at 828.
61. See National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of New York, 8
NY.2d 197, 205, 168 N.E.2d 651, 652-53, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, 827 (1960).
The New York act construed in National PsychologicalAssociationfor Psychoanalysis, was re-
pealed in 1971. The new certification act, which became effective September 1, 1971, has require-
ments for certification similar to those of its predecessor. The applicant must now possess a
doctorate in psychology and the psychology program must be one registered with the department
or the "substantial equivalent thereof." N.Y. EDuC. LAw § 7603(2) (McKinney 1972).
62. See notes 29-32 supra and accompanying text.
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tained his license through fraud or deception; impersonated a licensee
or permitted another person to use his license; or was guilty of unethi-
cal conduct as defined in "Ethical Standards for Psychologists,"
adopted and published by the Department.63 In addition, the Depart-
ment may revoke a license issued in error,' and has authority to enjoin
violations of the act.65
Appeal of license revocation decisions normally results in judicial
affirmation of the board's authority and decision to revoke the li-
cense.66 Courts acknowledge that the authority of a licensing board
63. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.035(1) (1978).
64. Id. § 337.035(2). The Department may not withhold, deny, revoke, or suspend a license
on the basis of race, national origin, or religious or political beliefs. Id. § 337.035(3). An appli-
cant whose license was refused or revoked may reapply for licensure within one year of the denial
or revocation. Id. § 337.035(4).
65. Id. § 337.065(2). Provisions similar to section 337.035 are commonly found in psycholo-
gist licensing acts. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-46 (1975) (board may refuse to grant or recom-
mend suspension of license on such grounds as use of fraud or deception in obtaining license;
conviction of felony; practice of psychology under pseudonym or impersonation of another practi-
tioner, habitual intemperance in use of spirits, narcotics, or stimulants to extent of impairment of
ability to work; or upon recommendation of ethics committee of Alabama Psychological Associa-
tion or American Psychological Association); ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.220 (1977) (board may repri-
mand, censure, place on probation, restrict practice, require further education, or revoke or
suspend a license upon finding problems of competence, experience, education, or health); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 20-192 (Supp. 1980) (board may revoke or suspend a license if licensee convicted of
felony; used fraud or deceit in obtaining license; violated any statutory or regulatory provisions;
practiced negligently or wrongfully or in area of psychology for which he or she was not quali-
fied); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1370(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1979-80) (board may suspend or revoke
license if licensee is convicted of a felony; is habitual drunkard or drug addict; uses fraud or deceit
in connection with services rendered as psychologist; aids or abets unlicensed person in represent-
ing oneself as a psychologist in Oklahoma; or engages in unprofessional or unethical conduct as
defined by the board). Several states provide the licensing agency with injunctive power. See,
e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 12-43-113 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3120 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
I 11, § 5327 (Smith-Hurd 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5343 (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 1373 (West 1971).
66. In Packer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 37 Cal. App. 3d 63, 112 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1974),
the court refused to command the board to set aside its decision revoking plaintiff's license to
practice psychology. Plaintiff fraudulently represented his educational qualifications on his appli-
cation for licensure in violation of a rule of the Psychology Examining Committee, prohibiting
misrepresentation of professional qualifications. Id. at 71, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82. The Commit-
tee's authority to issue such a rule is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF. C9DE § 2936 (Deering Supp.
1980), which provides that "The committee shall by rule or regulation, establish standards of
ethical conduct relating to the practice of psychology."
Plaintiff in Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 123 Cal. Rptr. 563
(1975), illegally prescribed and furnished dangerous drugs and engaged in sexual intimacies with
three female patients. After hearings the Psychology Examining Committee proposed license rev-
ocation, the State Board of Medical Examiners adopted this proposal, the superior court denied
plaintiff's petition for writ of administrative mandamus to review the board's decision, and the
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necessarily extends beyond the mere issuance of licenses. Licensing
boards have a continuing duty to establish and maintain standards of
professional conduct and to discipline licensees who fail to meet board
standards. The judiciary generally defers to board expertise in these
matters.67
There is increasing concern, however, that the procedures employed
by licensing boards in deciding whether to grant, revoke, deny, or sus-
pend a license sometimes deprive an applicant of adequate due process
protection.68 This concern is greatest in states where a single licensing
agency holds the powers of investigation, prosecution, and adjudica-
tion.69 The combination of investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudica-
tive functions enhances the agency's interests in public protection and
administrative efficiency, and promotes the use of procedures designed
to exercise and implement agency policies. These interests must be bal-
anced against the individual's countervailing interests in receipt or re-
tention of a professional license and the use of fair licensing and
revocation procedures.7" The administrative agency attains maximum
effectiveness when it functions as both prosecutor and adjudicator,7'
court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 937-38, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 575. Section 2960 of the California
Business and Professions Code authorizes the committee to deny, suspend, revoke, or impose
probationary conditions upon a license, or issue a license with terms and conditions, for several
causes, including gross negligence of a licensee in the practice of his profession. CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE § 29600) (Deering Supp. 1980). The board complies with committee orders after a
hearing regarding a licensee's status. Id. § 2961.
67. In Morra v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 212 Kan. 103, 510 P.2d 614 (1973),
the board revoked the certificate of plaintiff who had engaged in sexual improprieties with two
female patients. The revocation accorded with the Kansas certification of psychologists act which
provides that the board of examiners of psychologists may revoke or suspend a certificate upon
proof that a psychologist engaged in unprofessional conduct as defined by board rules or acted
negligently or wrongfully in performance of his or her duties. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5324(d)-(e)
( 1972). The court affirmed the board's order, maintair ing that the board's action was based on
substantial evidence; was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or oppressive; and was within the board's
authority and competence. 212 Kan. 103, 106-10, 510 P.2d 614, 618-21 (1973). In response to
plaintiff's argument that the term "wrongful actions" in the statute is unconstitutionally vague as
grounds for license revocation or suspension, the court asserted that "a member of the profession
to which the act applies would have no difficulty in comprehending what the term implies so far as
his conduct as a psychologist is concerned." Id. at 111, 510 P.2d at 622.
68. Note, Due Process Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REV. 1097 (1973);
Comment, Procedural Due Process and the Separation of Functions in State Occupational Licensing
4gencies, 1978 WIs. L. REV. 833.
69. Comment, Procedural Due Process and the Separation ofFunctions in State Occupational
Licensing Agencies, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 833.
70. Id. at 841.
71. The agency acts as prosecutor when it denies, suspends, or revokes licenses. This is, of
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but the individual's protection against bias or prejudgment is enhanced
when these functions are separated.72
Missouri's creation of the Administrative Hearing Commission
(AHC)7 3 is one example of a legislative attempt to achieve a degree of
separation of agency functions by delegating adjudicative power to an
entity independent of the licensing board.7 The AHC conducts hear-
ings on complaints by applicants or licensees aggrieved by certain
agencies, including the Board of Healing Arts, and makes final deci-
sions on issues of fact and law.75 The AHC recommends appropriate
disciplinary action, but the licensing agency may conduct a separate
hearing to determine proper discipline.76
Many procedural concerns were resolved in 1975, when the United
course, a significant means of implementing agency policy. Id. at 847. The delegation of adjudi-
catory powers to the licensing board enables it to establish and apply general standards and poli-
cies and to follow a flexible case-by-case approach in the absence of general policy. Id.
72. Id. at 862.
73. See 1965 Mo. Laws 277. The Administrative Hearing Commission is assigned to the
Department of Consumer Affairs, Registration, and Licensing. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 161.252(1)
(1978).
74. Other examples of legislative attempts to separate agency functions can be found in Cali-
fornia and Alaska, where hearing examiners conduct hearings for licensing agencies but may only
propose a decision and order;, the agency retains authority to make the final decision on both the
facts and the action to be taken. More complete separation of functions is achieved in Maine,
where a hearing commissioner conducts license hearings and has power to make final decisions on
questions of fact and appropriate disciplinary action. Comment, Procedural Due Process and the
Separation of Functions in State OccuFational Licensing Agencies, 1978 Wis. L. REV. 833, 857-58.
Internal separation of functions, where duties are divided among agency members, provides an
insufficient safeguard against bias due to the close contacts among board members and the ease
with which ex parte communications occur. Id. at 862.
75. Mo. REV. STAT. § 161.272(1) (1978). The grievance can include license revocation or
suspension, placement of the licensee on probation, refusal to permit an applicant to take the
examination, or refusal to license an applicant who passed the examination or who is qualified for
licensure without examination.
76. Id. § 161.292. Prior to a disciplinary hearing, the licensing agency receives the record of
the AHC proceedings and the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations of the
AHC. This disciplinary hearing may be waived if the agency and licensee agree that the AHC
recommended appropriate disciplinary action. The AHC's recommendations then become the
agency's disciplinary order. Id.
Critics of the AHC allege usurpation of the Board's power to control licensees, but this loss of
control must be slight, if it exists at all, because the Board retains powers of investigation, prosecu-
tion, and punishment. Special Project, Fair Treatmentfor the Licensed Pro/essional The Missouri
Administrative Hearing Commission, 37 Mo. L. REV. 410, 451-52 (1972). Other criticisms of the
Missouri AHC include the charge that the Commissioner cannot be familiar with the laws and
rules, as well as the problems of each agency and cannot, therefore, make informed, responsible
decisions. A defense to this charge is that the expertise needed is simply that of statutory or
regulatory interpretation, a skill which any attorney possesses. Id. at 452-54.
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States Supreme Court held that due process is not violated when a li-
censing agency possesses both prosecutorial and adjudicative powers.77
Concerns, however, with procedural fairness persist. There is, for ex-
ample, increasing awareness of the inadequacies of the informal proce-
dures characteristic of professional licensing boards,78  and of the
potential bias and unfairness inherent in licensing boards comprised
exclusively of licensed professionals.79  To assure that the individual
applicant or licensee receives due process of law, states may choose to
develop additional procedural safeguards by enacting formal proce-
dures for licensing boards or appointing lay persons to serve on the
boards.
A common problem confronting legislatures drafting psychologist li-
censing acts is the determination of the act's scope of application. The
statute must be broad enough to prevent charlatans from practicing
psychology, but at the same time be sufficiently narrow to avoid usur-
pation of the activities of professionals in related fields such as psychia-
try, counseling, social work, and the ministry.80
Missouri and other states8' attempted to delineate their licensing
77. See Winthrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). The Wisconsin State Examining Board
attempted to suspend a physician's license finding that he engaged in proscribed conduct. The
three judge district court enjoined the suspension, holding that it would be a denial of procedural
due process to permit the board to suspend a license "at its own contested hearing on charges
evolving from its own investigation." Larkin v. Winthrow, 368 F. Supp. 796, 797 (E.D. Wis.
1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). The Supreme Court held in its reversal that the combination of
investigative and adjudicative functions in an agency does not per se violate procedural due proc-
ess. Courts may still examine the circumstances of each case to determine if there is an "intolera-
bly high" risk of unfairness. 421 U.S. at 58. See also Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49
Cal. App. 3d 931, 940, 123 Cal. Rptr. 563, 569 (1975) (court summarily rejected appellant's conten-
tion that delegation of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions to a single licensing board consti-
tuted a denial of procedural due process); Morra v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 212
Kan. 103, 108-09, 510 P.2d 614, 620 (1973) (court rejected plaintiffs complaint that the board
acted as investigator, grand jury, prosecutor, judge, and jury, on grounds that no prejudice may be
presumed from this combination of functions).
78. See The National Law Journal, Feb. 18, 1980, at 16, col. 4. Various attempts are being
made to achieve procedural reform. The National Association of Attorneys General recently dis-
tributed to state governments a "Disciplinary Action Manual for Occupational Licensing Boards"
to assist them in the codification of disciplinary board procedures. Id. See also 4 Model Profes-
sional and Occupational Licensing Act, 5 HARV. J. LEGIs. 67, 67-69 (1967) (proposes model act to
provide uniform procedures for professional licensing).
79. See note 22 supra. See also HANDBOOK, note 38 supra, at A-3 to -4 (psychology boards
must expect legislatures to appoint consumers as members in response to the needs of the public).
80. Wallace, Occupational Licensing and Certification: Remediesfor Denial, 14 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 46, 54 (1972).
81. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-114 (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3106 (1979); MD.
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acts' scope of application by including a broad exemption clause in the
psychologist licensing act. Qualified social psychologists in Missouri
who file a statement with the Department indicating their qualifications
can use the term "social psychologist" without licensure under the psy-
chologist licensing act.82  Furthermore, the statute does not prohibit
members of certain named professions-such as attorneys, clergymen,
social workers, and school, vocational, and vocational rehabilitation
counselors-from performing work of a psychological nature, provided
that they refrain from using the words "psychologist," "psychological,"
or "psychology" in their title. 3 The services of a psychology student or
trainee are not limited if his title indicates his status; 84 nor are the activ-
ities, services, or use of an official title by an employee of a governmen-
tal agency, educational institution, or corporation primarily engaged in
research restricted if the activities or services fall within the scope of his
employment duties.85 Finally, the statute distinguishes psychology
ANN. CODE art. 43, § 633 (1980); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.22 (Page Supp. 1979); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1353 (West 1971). See Macfarlane, Inter-Professional Relations antd Collabo-
ration with Medicine and Other RelatedFields, 5 AM. PSYCH. 112 (1950); Wendt, Legislationfor the
General Practice of Psychology Versus Legislation for Specialties within Psycholog, 5 Am. PSYCH.
107 (1950); Wolfe, Legal Control of Psychological Practice, 5 AM. PSYCH. 551 (1950) (all recom-
mended exempting certain professions from psychology licensing acts to avoid encroaching on
their domains).
82. A social psychologist is qualified if he possesses a doctoral degree in sociology or social
psychology, passed an examination in social psychology as part of the doctoral degree require-
ments, or has had "equivalent specialized training in social psychology." Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 337.040 (1978). Provisions similar to this exist in Arizona, Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2083(3)
(Supp. 1979-80); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5305(e) (Smith-Hurd 1978); and Mississippi,
Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-31-27(b) (1972).
83. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.045(1) (1978). For similar exemption provisions, see CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 2908 (Deering Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-195 (1979); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 2-484(E) (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 319.015(2) (Baldwin 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59,
§ 1353(a) (West 1971).
84. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.045(3) (1978). The majority of psychologist licensing or certi-
fication acts in other states contain a similar provision.
85. See id. § 337.045(2). Psychological techniques can be used by government institutions,
commercial organizations, or individuals for such purposes as evaluating applicants for employ-
ment or employees for promotion. Employment agencies may also use psychological techniques
in evaluation of clients for employment. Such psychological services cannot be sold for remunera-
tion unless performed or supervised by a duly licensed psychologist. Id. § 337.045(4). The Mis-
souri statute also exempts from licensure a practitioner who wishes temporarily to practice
psychology in Missouri. He or she must not be a Missouri resident and must conduct the major
part of his or her psychology practice outside Missouri. Id. § 337.045(5). Many states similarly
exempt from licensure the activities of a person employed by a government agency or certain
institutions. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-40 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-1 14(1)-(3) (1973);
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from medicine by prohibiting psychologists from practicing medicine.86
Various states have developed alternate solutions to clarify the scope
of psychologist licensing acts. These solutions include the enactment of
different stages of licensure for psychologists,87 and separate licensure
laws to cover occupations like counseling that are closely related to
psychology.8 The latter method of licensure aids the resolution of an
issue that confronts courts, legislatures, and agencies in many states,
including Missouri: should counselors, particularly those engaged in
private practice, be licensed under the state's psychologist licensing
act.8 9 Counselors generally prefer separate licensure,9 ° but in the ab-
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5305(a)-(c) (Smith-Hurd 1978); KAN. STAT. § 74-5344(c), (e) (1972);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-31-27(a)(l)-(2) (1972); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1353(b) (West 1971).
86. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.060 (1978). This, too, is a very common provision in psychol-
ogy licensing acts. See, e.g.. ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.86.180(c), .185(c) (1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 32-2084 (Supp. 1978-80); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, § 5305(d) (Smith-Hurd 1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 43, § 639 (1980). Legislatures have struggled with the distinction between psychologists
and psychiatrists; the key issue is whether psychotherapy should be the exclusive responsibility of
psychiatrists, and psychological counseling the duty of licensed clinical psychologists. Psychother-
apy and psychological counseling are distinguished in that the former is designed to treat the
maladjusted or ill person, while the latter is the treatment of a healthy person with an isolated,
minor problem. See Menninger, The Relationship of Clinical Psychology and Psychiatry, 5 AM.
PSYCH. 3, 5-11 (1950). Opinions on this issue range from absolute prohibition to unlimited au-
thorization of the practice of psychotherapy by psychologists. See Note, Regulation of Psychologi-
cal Counseling and Psychotherapy, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 474, 491-94 (1951). The Missouri act
includes the rendition of psychotherapy within its definition of the "practice of psychology." Mo.
REV. STAT. § 337.015(3) (1978). Several states permit psychologists to practice psychotherapy but
only in conjunction with a physician, usually a psychiatrist. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-1(b)
(1975) (psychologist practicing psychotherapy must initiate and maintain communication with
physician); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. I11, § 5305(d) (Smith-Hurd 1978) (psychologists who treat the
mentally ill or individuals in need of mental treatment must establish and maintain collaboration
with a physician); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.20 (Page 1977) (psychologist who practices psy-
chological psychotherapy must consult with physician).
87. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 08.86.010-.230 (1977) (psychologists must have doctorate in
psychology, psychological associate must have master's degree with emphasis in counseling);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148.91 (West Supp. 1980) (licensed consulting psychologist must possess doc-
torate in psychology; licensed psychologist must possess doctorate or master's degree in psychol-
ogy); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.1 1(a)-(b) (Supp. 1979) (practicing psychologist must possess
doctorate in psychology; psychological associate must possess master's degree in psychology);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4732. 10(B)-(C) (Page 1977) (licensed psychologist must have doctorate
in psychology; licensed school psychologist must have master's degree in school psychology).
88. See, e.g.. ALA. CODE §§ 34-8A-1 to -23 (Supp. 1979) & §§ 34-26-1 to -48 (1975); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 2900-2918 (Deering 1975) & §§ 17800-17882 (Deering 1976); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 84-7001 to -7023 (1979); VA. CODE §§ 54-932 to -935, -941 to -943 (1978).
89. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
90. See Sweeney and Sturdevant, Licensure in the Helping Professions.- Anatomy of an Issue,
52 PERSONNEL AND GUIDANCE J. 574, 580-81 (1974) (counselors should seek separate licensure
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sence of a separate licensing law, they usually desire psychologist licen-
sure to achieve professional status9' and ensure the continuance of their
practice. 92 Psychologists, however, generally oppose granting counsel-
ors a license to practice psychology. 93 Psychologists question whether
counselor training is "primarily psychological," especially where train-
ing is conducted in an education department, 94 because training pro-
grams generally lack sufficient courses in core areas of psychology.95
Judicial review of the issue has been scanty. An Alabama court up-
held the decision, by the State's Board of Examiners in Psychology, to
deny psychologist licensure to an applicant who possessed a doctorate
from a school of education, with a major in counseling, guidance, and
educational psychology. 96 The court agreed with the Board that the
applicant's education was deficient, despite his specialized training in
counseling, because he lacked training in the core areas of psychology
essential for a generic psychologist license.9 7 In In re Partin9" a North
from psychologists or, where counselor licensure is already subsumed under psychologist licensure
laws, should seek representation on state boards).
91. One aspect of this "professional status" that counselors desire is for communications to
them to be made privileged. Id. at 580. One court, however, expressly rejected a counselor/client
privilege while granting the privilege to communications made to a licensed professional psychol-
ogist. The court reasoned that a psychologist, through his use of psychotherapeutic techniques,
explored deeply into his patient's psychic processes; a counselor's treatment was more superficial.
Hence, there was less need for a privilege to foster the relationship between counselor and client.
Allred v. State, 554 P.2d 411, 419 (Alaska 1976).
92. If the definition of "psychology" in a psychologist licensing act includes the use of coun-
seling techniques, counselors believe they must obtain psychologist licensure in order to practice.
They fear, however, that they will be deprived of their constitutional right to practice their chosen
profession, because state psychology boards, which are composed of psychologists, deny counsel-
ors licensure or permission to take the licensure examination. VAN Hoos- & KOrLCR supra note
8, at 123-24.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 122.
95. Traweek v. Alabama Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, No. 198-073 (Jefferson County,
Ala., Cir. Ct., 1976), cited in Smith, Psychology and the Courts: Some Implications ofRecent Judi-
cial Decisionsfor State Licensing Boards, 9 PROFESSIONAL PSYCH. 489, 494 (1978).
Psychologists distinguish counselors from counseling psychologists in that only the latter meet
psychologist licensure requirements. Counseling psychologists are graduates of an integrated doc-
toral program qualifying them for generic licensure or certification; the program can be in a de-
partment of psychology or education. Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Delegates of the
American Association of State Psychology Boards (Aug. 25, 1977).
96. Traweek v. Alabama Bd. of Examiners in Psychology, No. 198-073 (Jefferson County,
Ala., Cir. Ct., 1976) cited in Smith, Psychology and the Courts: Some Implications o/Recent Judi-
cial Decirionsfor State Licensing Boards, 9 PROFESSIONAL PSYCH. 489, 494 (1978).
97. Id. Application of the basic core of knowledge standard to all candidates for generic
licensure has occasionally caused licensing boards to find psychology specialists, for example in
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Carolina appellate court sustained the board's denial of a license to a
candidate for psychologist licensure who held a doctoral degree in Gui-
dance and Counseling. The board based its denial of licensure on the
applicant's failure to fulfill the board's educational requirements rule,
which required applicants with a doctorate in a field other than psy-
chology to prove they had completed at least sixty graduate semester
hours in psychology courses or courses that were psychological in na-
ture.99 The board refused to consider the applicant's courses in voca-
tional rehabilitation, guidance, and counseling when determining if he
had enough credits to fulfill the rule's requirements. 100
The Mississippi Supreme Court reached a different conclusion, how-
ever, in State Board of Psychological Examiners v. Coxe. 0' In Coxe
the board insisted that an applicant's major area of graduate study
have "psychology" in its title and was unwilling to examine the sub-
stance of an applicant's course of study."°2 The court held that the
board acted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner when it refused
to grant a psychologist license solely because the applicant obtained his
doctoral training in a department of guidance and counseling.
educational psychology, to be deficient in the educational requirements. Foltz, Sun Sets on Psy-
chologp Licensing Boards in South Dakota and Florida, APA MONITOR 14 (Sept./Oct. 1979).
98. 37 N.C. App. 302, 246 S.E.2d 519 (1978).
99. The Educational Requirements rule provided that an applicant who does not possess a
doctorate in psychology may receive credit toward the sixty graduate semester hour requirement
for courses in departments other than psychology if he or she supplies evidence "in a form speci-
fied by the board, that such courses are psychological in nature. This evidence shall consist of a
description of the courses, text book used, name of professor and statement of professor's member-
ship in national, regional and state psychological associations and his or her license or certification
status." Id. at 309, 246 S.E.2d at 524.
100. The court maintained that the applicant had the burden of presenting evidence to the
board that the content of his courses was primarily psychological in nature. The record showed
that the applicant only presented "conclusory opinions" of himself and his instructor as to the
nature of his courses, and the court agreed with the board that this evidence was inadequate. Id.
at 312-15, 246 S.E.2d at 524-26.
101. 355 So. 2d 669 (Miss. 1978). The court held that the chancellor had not exceeded his
powers by ordering licensure. Courts ordinarily defer to the judgment of an administrative
agency except when the agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious and not based on substantial
evidence. Id. at 671. For a discussion of the chancery court's findings and conclusions, see Smith,
Psvcholog' and the Courts: Some Implications of Recent Judicial Decisionsfor State Licensing
Boards, 9 PROFESSIONAL PSYCH. 489, 493 (1978).
102. Another court approved board policy that did not absolutely require that the applicant's
graduate degree be labeled as in "psychology" since there is a variety of possible names for an
acceptable major. The court insisted that the board examine course substance and not merely
consider in what department the university happened to place the course. Berl v. Board of Psy-
chologist Examiners, 322 A.2d 274, 275-76 (D.C. 1974).
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A California court distinguished counselors and psychologists in
Packer v. Board of Behavioral Science Examiners,t0 3 and held that a
licensed psychologist in California was precluded from obtaining a
marriage, family, and child counseling license by the reciprocity provi-
sion of the California Marriage, Family, and Child Counselors Act. l04
The court maintained that the education and experience requirements
for psychologist and counselor licensure were not substantially
equivalent. 10 5 An Ohio court similarly distinguished between counsel-
ors and psychologists, holding that a counselor who possessed a doc-
toral degree in counseling could not be criminally charged with
practicing psychology without a license."0 6 In Weldon v. Virginia State
Board of Psychologist Examiners"°7 plaintiff engaged in a private coun-
seling practice without seeking a license to practice psychology. The
State Board of Psychologist Examiners obtained a court order en-
joining him from further practice. On appeal, the court enforced the
injunction and held that, although counseling and psychology are dis-
tinct professions, the Virginia psychologist licensing act applies to all
practitioners who use psychological tools.'0
Case law thus reveals that applicants for psychologist licensure who
possess graduate degrees in counseling cannot predict whether they will
receive a license. In view of this uncertainty, state legislatures should
either enact separate licensing requirements for counselors and other
behavioral science professions or explicitly state the occupational scope
of the psychologist licensing act on its face.
Many psychologist licensing acts allow for potential violations of the
nondelegation doctrine. The doctrine prohibits the legislature from
103. 52 Cal. App. 3d 190, 125 Cal. Rptr. 96 (1975).
104. Id. at 194, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 98-99. The reciprocity provision permits counseling licensure
of individuals licensed by a "corresponding authority of any state" where the licensure require-
ments are "substantially the equivalent" of the California requirements for counselor icensure.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17809 (Deering 1976).
105. 52 Cal. App. 3d 190, 194, 125 Cal. Rptr. 96, 98-99 (1975). The court further observed
that the Board of Medical Examiners, which granted plaintiffs psychology license, is not a "corre-
sponding authority of any state" because it differs significantly from the Board of Marriage Coun-
selor Examiners and is not located in another state. Id.
106. City of Cleveland v. Cook, 75-CRB 11478 (Cleveland Mun. Ct. 1975), cited in VAN
HoosE & KO-TrLER, supra note 8, at 123.
107. (Newport News, Va. Corporation Ct., Oct. 4, 1974), cited in VAN Hoost. & KOTrLER,
supra note 8, at 122-23.
108. Id. The Virginia legislature resolved this conflict when it enacted a separate licensing law
for counselors. See note 88 spra and accompanying text.
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delegating its law-making powers to an administrative agency. Legisla-
tures must be careful to guide the exercise of administrative discretion
by supplying the agency with clearly defined standards. 1°9 The Mis-
souri legislature potentially violated the nondelegation doctrine by au-
thorizing the Department to license an applicant who has "satisfactory
supervised experience" and a graduate degree in a "primarily psycho-
logical" area of study.1 0 The courts are split on the issue of whether
delegation of power to licensing boards violates the nondelegation doc-
trine. The plaintiff in National Psychological Association for Psycho-
analysis v. University of New York I ' challenged the New York certifi-
cation act as an unlawful delegation of legislative power." 2 Plaintiff
was particularly concerned with the board's power to define the "sub-
stantial equivalent" of a doctoral degree in the context of "satisfactory
supervised experience." The court held that assigning to the board the
task of implementing the statute and defining its terms did not consti-
tute an invalid delegation of legislative power. The court reasoned that
there were clearly discernible standards to govern the board. Board
expertise thus could be afforded deference." 3 The court in In rePartin
similarly concluded that the legislature, in permitting the board to
grant licenses to applicants possessing doctoral degrees based on a "pri-
marily psychological" program of studies, provided the board with suf-
ficiently clear standards to control its exercise of the delegated
rulemaking and licensing functions.""' 4
The court in Cohen v. State1I5 held that the legislature lawfully dele-
gated its power when it granted the licensing board authority to define
the programs of study that are "primarily psychological" and the edu-
cational experiences that are "substantially equivalent" to a doctoral
degree in psychology. The court concluded that clarification of these
terms is a proper administrative function for which the board is pecu-
liarly qualified. An administrative agency may have substantial au-
109. See National Psychological Ass'n for Psychoanalysis v. University of New York, 8
N.Y.2d 197, 203, 168 N.E.2d 649, 652, 203 N.Y.S.2d 821, 826, appeal dismLsed, 365 U.S. 298
(1960).
110. Mo. REv. STAT. § 337.020(2) (1978).
111. 8 N.Y.2d 197, 204, 168 N.E.2d 649, 652-53, 203 N.Y.S. 2d 821, 827, appeal dismissed, 365
U.S. 298 (1960).
112. See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. In re Partin, 37 N.C. App. 302, 310, 246 S.E.2d 519, 524-25 (1978).
115. 121 Ariz. App. 20, 588 P.2d 313, modoled, 121 Ariz. 6, 588 P.2d 299 (1978). See notes
109-14 supra and accompanying text.
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thority in administration of a statute enacted pursuant to the state's
police power. Standards for the agency need not be expressed if they
can reasonably be inferred from the statutory scheme. 16
The Supreme Court of Florida in Husband v. Cassel,"7 however,
held that the Florida licensing act amounted to an unconstitutional del-
egation of legislative power to an administrative agency without ade-
quate standards to guide the agency. The court found offensive
statutory language in the Act authorizing the board of examiners of
psychology to require that applicants possess a doctorate or equivalent
degree in psychology from a board-approved university." 8 The offen-
sive language enabled the board to exercise unbridled discretion in de-
termining the nature and scope of the field covered by the examination,
qualities of an acceptable university, and qualifications for a program
to constitute the substantial equivalent of a doctorate in psychology.
The legislature unlawfully delegated exclusive responsibility to the
board to determine what qualifications were necessary for psychologist
certification. "19
116. Id. at 26-27, 588 P.2d at 319-20. A California court upheld a license revocation and
rejected plaintiffs charges that the licensing act constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative
power in Cooper v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Cal. App. 3d 931, 123 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1975).
The court held that legislative delegation of power to the Psychology Examining Committee to
promulgate rules of professional conduct is proper legislative deference to an agency's expertise.
Id. at 939, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
The American Association of State Psychology Boards maintains that legislatures should write
broad licensing statutes and defer to agency expertise in the application and definition of the acts'
terms. Boards have greater understanding of the requirements for the competent practice of psy-
chology and changes to board rules can be made more easily than can statutory amendments. See
HANDBOOK, supra note 38, at G-1.
117. 130 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1961).
118. See FLA. STAT. § 490.04(1) (1959), construedin Husband v. Cassel, 130 So. 2d 69, 70-71
(Fla. 1961).
119. Id. at 71-72. Florida courts have tended to apply strictly the nondelegation doctrine. See,
e.,., Wasserman v. Florida State Bd. of Architecture, 361 So. 2d 792 (Fla. 1978) (statute permit-
ting board to require that applicant for registration hold a professional degree from an approved
school, or educational training equivalent to such a degree, constituted an unlawful delegation of
legislative power); Harrington & Co. v. Tampa Port Auth., 358 So. 2d 168 (Fla. 1978) (statute
permitting Port Authority to grant stevedore licenses to competent and trustworthy persons and to
grant as many licenses as it deemed necessary amounted to abdication of lawmaking responsibil-
ity); Delta Truck Brokers, Inc. v. King, 142 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 1962) (legislature must provide ade-
quate standards to guide agency in granting automobile transportation brokerage license).
In response to Husband, the Florida legislature amended the unconstitutional sections of its
statute. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 490.041(1) (West 1965) required an applicant for certification to pass a
board administered examination in psychology which must cover "those subjects relating to the
practice of psychology as are taught by the universities approved by the American [P]sychological
[A]ssociation." Further, the applicant must possess "a doctoral degree with a major in psychology
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These cases indicate that a court challenge to psychologist licensing
acts on the ground that they violate the nondelegation doctrine has
only a minimal chance of success in Missouri and other states. Absent
strict application of the nondelegation doctrine, delegations of power to
administrative agencies will be upheld as a legitimate instance of legis-
lative deference to administrative expertise.
Psychologist licensing agencies may, however, violate a second as-
pect of the nondelegation doctrine: the agency may act outside the lim-
its of its delegated authority in promulgating rules and deciding
licensing issues. The Missouri act authorizes the Department to pro-
mulgate rules governing the conduct of committee members and "en-
abling the committee to function and carry out the purposes of [the
act]." 120 In collaboration with the Board of Healing Arts, the Commit-
tee is authorized to guide, advise, and make recommendations to the
Department.1 21  All rules, regulations, and advisory opinions expire
two years after their promulgation. 22 Legislatures in other states simi-
larly grant broad rulemaking power to the psychologist licensing
agency.123 In some states, however, the Board's power to promulgate
from a university whose program has been approved by the American [Plsychological
[Aissociation; or. . . from a university maintaining a standard of training comparable to those
universities approved by the American [P]sychological [A]ssociation." Id. § 490.041(l)(c)(l)-(2).
The statute did not specify who was to determine which universities are comparable to those
bearing American Psychological Association approval and did not provide for certification of ap-
plicants possessing the "substantial equivalent" of a doctorate in psychology. The legislature en-
acted a new Florida Psychological Practice Act in 1970. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 490.19(1) (West Supp.
1979) provides for board examination of each applicant "under such rules and regulations as the
board may prescribe." The educational requirements remained the same, id. § 490.19(l)(c), and
were challenged in Carroll v. State, Div. of Professions, 355 So. 2d 495 (Fla. App. 1978). The
board denied plaintiff the right to take the certification examination on the ground that her doc-
toral degree in pupil placement services was not obtained at a university that "maintained in such
doctoral program a standard of training comparable to those universities having programs ap-
proved by the American Psychological Association for the granting of a doctoral degree in psy-
chology." Id. at 496. The hearing officer upheld the board's order and the court affirmed,
refusing to "substitute its judgment" for that of the board or hearing officer. Id. See note 168 infra
for a discussion of the fate of the Florida Psychological Practice Act.
120. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(5) (1978).
121. Id. § 337.050(1).
122. Id. § 337.050(7).
123. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.080 (1977) (board must adopt regulations necessary to
carry out purposes of statute); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43-104(3)(a) (1973) (board must adopt and
revise rules and regulations necessary to effectuate statutory provisions); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43,
§ 625 (1980) (board may make rules and regulations necessary for it to perform duties properly);
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4732.06 (Page 1977) (board makes rules "necessary to conduct its busi-
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rules concerning requirements for licensure is explicitly stated.' 24
In a case before Missouri's Administrative Hearing Commission, an
applicant who was denied grandfather licensure challenged three of the
Department's rules as beyond the scope of the Department's rulemak-
ing authority and as an improper exercise of the legislative function.t 25
The applicant argued that the licensing statute restricted the Depart-
ment's rulemaking power to promulgation of rules governing the Com-
mittee's conduct and that the three rules at issue impermissibly
established substantive standards that added to or contradicted the stat-
utory requirements for licensure.' 26 Respondent asserted that the rules
ness"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1359 (West 1971) (board may make rules necessary for it to
perform its duties properly and to regulate proceedings before it).
124. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-26-22 (Supp. 1979) (applicants for licensure must meet require-
ments stated in statute and in board rules and regulations); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-2063(2)
(Supp. 1979-80) (board will grant, deny, revoke, renew, and suspend certificates pursuant to state
and board rules and regulations); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2930(b)-(c) (Deering Supp. 1979)
(applicant must have education and supervised experience as required by duly adopted committee
regulations).
125. See Greensfelder v. Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation & Licensing, No.
78154 (April 5, 1979) (Before the Administrative Hearing Commission). Petitioner held a master's
degree with most of her graduate course work in educational counseling, and over ten years of
professional experience at a counseling agency and in private practice. St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
April 6, 1979, at 1 IA, col. 4. Many other cases before the AHC were from persons who possessed
graduate degrees in counseling from departments of education and lacked sufficient course work
that was "primarily psychological" and that covered the five core areas of psychology delineated
in the Educational Requirements Rule. See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text. Washing-
ton University, concerned that many of the applicants who were denied licensure held master's
degrees in counseling from the Washington University Graduate Institute of Education, also
brought an action against the Department and the Committee; the AHC granted the University's
motion to consolidate with Greensfelder. See Washington Univ. v. Department of Consumer Af-
fairs, Regulation & Licensing, No. DJ-79-001 (April 5, 1979) (Before the Administrative Hearing
Commission).
126. Petitioner noted, for example, that the statute includes counseling in its definition of the
practice of psychology and includes educational and vocational counseling within its scope of
application, see Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.015(3)-(4) (1978), but the Educational Requirements Rule
fails to mention counseling as one of the core areas of psychology.
Petitioner further argued that the Educational Requirements Rule, 4 C.S.R. 235-3.010 (1977),
unlawfully established substantive standards for educational requirements, such as a minimum
number of hours of total course work in psychology taken in five out of fifteen basic areas in
psychology; that the Requirements for Licensure without Examination Rule, 4 C.S.R. 2354.010
(1977), unlawfully established a residency requirement for licensure without examination; and
that the supervised Professional Experience Rule, 4 C.S.R. 235-2.010 (1977), unlawfully estab-
lished substantive standards for supervision and training and for the supervisor's qualifications.
See Greensfelder v. Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation & Licensing, No. 78154 (April
5, 1979) (Motion for Summary Judgment, Before the Administrative Hearing Commission). See
also Washington Univ. v. State Comm. of Psychologists and Greensfelder v. State Comm. of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol58/iss3/9
Number 3] STATE REGULATION OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
provided the committee with standards that clarified the imprecise stat-
utory language t27 and thereby enabled the committee to fulfill the
legislative intent to permit only qualified persons to practice as psy-
chologists.'28 The AHC declared the Educational Requirements Rule
invalid, holding that it added to the statutory educational requirements
for psychologist licensure in a way unauthorized by law and in effect
altered statutory law.'29
Psychologists (April 5, 1979) (Hearing Transcript, Before the Administrative Hearing Commis-
sion) [hereinafter cited as Hearing Transcript].
127. The statutory language includes amorphous phrases such as "satisfactory supervised pro-
fessional experience in the general field of psychology," Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020(2) (1978),
"program of studies whose content was primarily psychological," id § 337.020(2)(a)-(b), and "en-
gaged in the active profession of psychology," id. § 337.020(5).
128. See Hearing Transcript, supra note 126, at 17-22. Respondent further contended that the
statute as a whole presumes the promulgation of rules and regulations. Section 337.050(7) of the
Missouri Revised Statutes, which provides for the expiration of rules, regulations, advisory opin-
ions or amendments within two years of promulgation, implies that such rules will not be con-
cerned solely with the functioning of the Committee. Further, implied rulemaking power exists in
Section 337.035(4) of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which directs the Department to publish
"Ethical Standards for Psychologists."
129. See Greensfelder v. Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation & Licensing, No.
78154 (April 5, 1979) and Washington Univ. v. Department of Consumer Affairs, Regulation &
Licensing, No. DJ-79-001 (April 6, 1979) (Statement of the Case, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decisions, Before the Administrative Hearing Commission). The Commissioner held
that the Department's rulemaking authority is restricted to that set out in section 337.050(5) gov-
erning committee functions. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.050(5) (1978). The AHC did not rule on the
validity of the Supervised Professional Experience and the Requirements for Licensure without
Examination Rules.
Respondent decided not to appeal the AHC's decision. The decision not to appeal may have
been based in part on practical considerations. There were approximately 250 people awaiting a
hearing. If the decision invalidating the Educational Requirements Rule were appealed and the
Rule found to have been lawfully promulgated, the Department and Committee would then have
had to face a challenge of the reasonableness of the Rule. The process would naturally consume
time, and the delay could constitute due process violations for those awaiting hearings. An emer-
gency rescission of 4 C.S.R 235-3.010 was filed on April 12, 1979, bearing an effective date of
March 23, 1979. The final rescission of the regulation occurred November 1, 1979.
Following this decision, the Committee reviewed all applications from candidates who had
been denied licensure because of deficient education. The Committee's only standard for review
was the statutory requirement that the doctoral or master's degree be "based on a program of
studies whose content was primarily psychological." Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020 (2)(a)-(b) (1978).
Many applicants, including Greensfelder, were granted licensure under this standard; others were
again denied licensure because their courses of study were not "primarily psychological" or on
other grounds not named before, such as unsatisfactory supervised professional experience. The
AHC has held hearings for several of the applicants redenied licensure because of deficient pro-
grams of study and has granted licenses to many of these applicants simply because it disagreed
with the Committee's determination of what constituted a "primarily psychological" course of
study. (Information obtained through conversations with Committee members.).
Missouri has now entered the post-grandfather clause stage of psychologist regulation. The
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A North Carolina court of appeals, however, reached a contrary con-
clusion when interpreting similar statutory language.1 30 The North
Carolina psychologist licensing act authorized the board to promulgate
rules and regulations "as may be necessary to regulate its proceedings
and otherwise to implement the provisions of [the act]."' 3' The court
declared that the board, in promulgating an educational requirements
rule applicable to applicants not possessing a degree in psychology, 3
2
acted within its rulemaking authority. The court found the rule consis-
tent with legislative intent and reasonably necessary to implement the
act.' 33 Similarly, the Oklahoma board has authority to promulgate
rules necessary to the proper performance of board duties. t34 An
Oklahoma court, concerned only with the reasonableness of a board
rule that interpreted statutory language, did not even question the
existence of the board's authority to promulgate the rule.' 35
In general, a licensing board authorized to promulgate rules to im-
plement the statute can issue rules that clarify imprecise statutory
Department offered its first Examination for the Professional Practice of Psychology on October
14, 1979. The American Association of State Psychology Boards developed this examination with
the intent of establishing minimum standards nationwide for psychologist certification or licen-
sure. The test was first offered in 1965. The test measures knowledge across a broad range of
psychology that all psychologists, regardless of their specialties, should possess. The examination
was primarily geared for applicants with a doctoral degree in psychology plus one or two years of
supervised experience. Studies show that holders of a doctorate of philosophy score significantly
higher than do holders of a master's degree or a doctorate in education. Applicants specializing in
industrial, clinical, or social psychology in general score higher than those in experimental psy-
chology. Counseling and educational psychologists achieve the lowest scores. Terris, The Na-
tional Licensing Examination, 4 PROFESSIONAL PSYCH. 386, 386-89 (1973). In Missouri,
approximately 57 candidates took the examination and 31 failed. Approximately 70% of those
who failed held master's degrees. The Committee, therefore, may have felt its efforts to be strin-
gent were exonerated by the results of this examination. See Cathcart & Graft, Occipatlonal Li-
censing." Factoring It Out, 9 PAC. L.J. 147, 147 (1978) (purpose of examination is to validate
minimum standard of knowledge that should have been learned and retained through course
work and supervised experience).
130. See In re Partin, 37 N.C. App. 302, 246 S.E.2d 519 (1978).
131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-270.9 (1975), construed in In re Partin, 37 N.C. App. 302, 310, 246
S.E.2d 519, 525 (1978).
132. See notes 98-99 supra and accompanying text.
133. 37 N.C. App. 302, 310, 246 S.E. 2d 519, 524-25 (1978). The court observed that the Edu-
cational Requirements Rule evinced board recognition of the fact that an applicant may fulfill the
statutory educational requirement of possession of a degree based on a "primarily psychological"
program of studies through a program that is not strictly labeled as one in psychology. Id.
134. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1359 (West 1971).
135. See Whittle v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328 (Okla. 1971). The
court's inquiry focused on the board rule interpreting the statutory requirement that grandfather
applicants have "satisfactory professional experience."
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terms. Such rules assist the board in making licensing decisions, mini-
mize the potential for a charge of acting in an arbitrary and capricious
manner, and provide the public with precise notice of licensure require-
ments. Board promulgated rules should be upheld if they are reason-
able and consistent with the legislative scheme.
A final issue 36 surrounding psychologist licensing acts concerns the
stringency of the requirements for grandfather licensure. A grand-
father provision is essential in statutes that regulate a previously unreg-
ulated profession because courts view an individual's professional
practice as a vested property right of which he or she cannot be de-
prived without due process of law.' 37 Missouri's grandfather licensure
136 The Missouri Act requires that the communications be made in the course of professional
services and provides that the licensed psychologist cannot be compelled to testify concerning any
privileged communication without the communicator's consent. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.055
(1978). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-496 (1973) (psychologist/patient privilege same as physi-
cian/patient privilege); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3118 (1979) (communications between psychologist
and client privileged as are attorney/client communications); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-5323 (1972)
(same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1372 (West 1971) (same).
The Alaska statute provides that "[no] psychologist or psychological associate may reveal to
another person a communication made to him or her by a client of his or hers about a matter
concerning which the client has employed the psychologist or psychological associate in a profes-
sional capacity." Exceptions include professional conferences and written authorization from the
client permitting revelation of the communications. ALASKA STAT. § 08.86.200 (1977). In Allredv.
State, 554 P.2d 411 (Alaska 1976), the Alaska Supreme Court held that this provision makes a
client's communications to his psychologist confidential, but does not create a testimonial privi-
lege. The court then proceeded to establish a common-law psychotherapist/client privilege that
encompasses court room testimony. Its recognition of a common-law privilege was based on a
four part test. First, the court noted the inherent confidentiality of communications to a psycho-
therapist in the course of treatment. Second, this confidentiality is essential to achievement of the
goals of psychotherapy. Third, society has an interest in the psychotherapist-patient relationship
and it should be fostered. Fourth, the injury to the psychotherapist-patient relationship caused by
fear of disclosure outweighs the benefits justice would derive from disclosure. Id. at 416-18. The
court was careful to restrict the scope of this privilege to communications made to psychiatrists or
licensed pyschologists. Communications to counselors, psychiatric social workers, and psycholog-
ical associates are not privileged. Id. at 418.
Many states provide an exception to the privilege that arises when the purpose of the proceed-
ing is to determine mental competency or the client raised the defense of mental incapacity. See,
e.g.. D.C. CODE ANN. ch. I 1, § 5306(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979). Making psychologist/client
communications confidential is one of the chief purposes of psychologist licensure or certification
acts and is an important way to enhance the profession's status. National Psychological Ass'n for
Psychoanalysis v. University of New York, 8 N.Y.2d 197, 201-02, 168 N.E.2d 649, 651-52, 203
N.Y.S.2d 821, 824-25, appeal dismised, 365 U.S. 298 (1960). See also Geiser & Rheingold, Psy-
chology and the Legal Process- Testimonial Privileged Communications, 19 AM. PSYCH. 831, 832
(1964) (privileged communications between client and psychologist as a professional status sym-
bol).
137. See Whittle v. State Bd. of Examiners of Psychologists, 483 P.2d 328, 329 (Okla. 1971).
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provision permits individuals practicing psychology prior to enactment
of the licensing statute to obtain a license without examination. 138 The
grandfather applicant must, however, meet all other qualifications re-
quired of nongrandfather applicants, including possession of an appro-
priate master's or doctoral degree. 139
The Illinois Psychologist Registration Act 4° and the Practice of Psy-
chology Act of the District of Columbia'' contained grandfather
clauses similar to Missouri's because both required a master's or doc-
toral degree for grandfather licensure.142 Neither clause, however, sur-
Accord, Miller v. Carter, 547 F.2d 1314, 1328 (7th Cir. 1977) (right to engage in a particular type
of employment is a very important right); Division of Beverage of Fla. Dept. of Business Regula-
tion v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc., 330 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 1976) (liquor distributor license is an
existing investment which must be protected against sudden shift of public policy); State v.
Bridwell, 592 P.2d 520, 525 (Okla. 1979) (license to practice a profession is at least a property
interest that deserves appropriate protection).
138. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.020(5) (1978).
139. Id. House Bill No. 255 required less stringent qualifications for licensure of practicing
psychologists than of post-grandfather period applicants. The House Bill required grandfather
applicants to possess either a doctoral degree plus one year of "satisfactory supervised professional
experience," H.B. 255 § 3(2)(3)-(4), 79th General Assembly, 1st Sess. (1977), or a master's degree
plus five years of "professional experience satisfactory to the committee." Id. § 4(2)(2). Future
applicants must possess a doctoral degree, plus one year of supervised professional experience. Id.
§ 3(2)(3)-(4).
Numerous other states also require that applicants for grandfather licensure possess an ad-
vanced degree. Some states do not distinguish between grandfather and future applicants in terms
of educational requirements. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 154B.6(3) (West Supp. 1980-81) (all
applicants must possess either doctoral or master's degree); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148, 92 (West
Supp. 1979) (all applicants for licensure as a consulting psychologist must possess doctorate; all
applicants for licensure as psychologist must possess doctorate or master's degree). Several states
place less stringent educational requirements on grandfather applicants. See, e.g., ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 111, § 5312 (Smith-Hurd 1978) (post-grandfather applicants must possess doctorate;
grandfather applicants may possess only a master's degree); KAN. STAT. § 74-5312 (1972) (same);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 319.061 (Baldwin 1979) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1366 (West
1971) (same).
140. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111, §§ 5301-5329 (Smith-Hurd 1978).
141. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-481 to 2-494 (West Supp. 1978-79).
142. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11, § 53 12(a) (Smith-Hurd 1978). This statute provides that for two
years after the date the act became effective, a "[m]aster's degree in psychology from an approved
college, university, or other institution and 2 years professional experience which is deemed satis-
factory by the Department . . . meet the education and examination requirements" placed on
future candidates for licensure. These requirements include "a doctoral degree in psychology
from a college, university, or other institution approved by the Department," Id. § 5311 (d); "at
least 2 years of satisfactory professional experience," id. § 531 1(e); and "passling] an examination
conducted by the Department to determine. . . fitness to receive a certificate." Id. § 5311(0.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-487 (West Supp. 1978-79) provides that, within one year after the effective
date of the act, an applicant may be licensed without examination if he or she is of good moral
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vived judicial scrutiny. Plaintiff in Taylor v. Hayes143 possessed a
bachelor's degree in psychology, thirty-two hours of post-graduate
study at approved schools, and nine years of practical experience as a
psychologist. The Illinois Department of Education and Registration
informed Taylor that his educational and practical experience was stat-
utorily insufficient to warrant grandfather licensure.144 On review an
Illinois appellate court assumed that a person who has practiced a pro-
fession for years is qualified to practice that profession.145 Because the
plaintiff's right to pursue his profession existed prior to enactment of
the licensure act, the regulation of his profession must be reasonable as
it affects him146 The court found the act arbitrary, unreasonable, and
unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff because it failed to provide a
method for determining whether a person previously engaged in the
practice of psychology qualified for licensure even though that person
lacked an advanced degree.'
47
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Berger v. Board of Psychologist Examinerst48 held the Psychology Act's
character, maintains a residence or office in the District of Columbia, pays the application fee, and
possesses either:
(A) a doctoral degree in psychology from an accredited college or university or other doctoral
degree acceptable to the Commissioner, and has completed at least two years of postgraduate
experience not including terms of internship, or (B) a master's degree in psychology from an
accredited college or university, and has engaged in psychological practice acceptable to the Com-
missioner for at least seven years after the attainment of his or her highest degree. Id.
143. 131 I11. App. 2d 305, 264 N.E.2d 814 (1970).
144. Id. at 308, 264 N.E.2d at 815. Plaintiff alleged that this denial oficensure had a substan-
tial effect on him in that he could no longer present himself as a psychologist, either in the tele-
phone book or on his office door;, he lost his membership in his professional organization; and he
received a decreased number of referrals and a concomitant loss of income. Id. at 380,264 N.E.2d
at 816.
145. Id. at 310-11, 264 N.E.2d at 817. To support this assumption the court cited Watson v.
Maryland, 218 U.S. 173 (1910), in which the Supreme Court declared that "those who have ac-
ceptably followed the profession in the community for a period of years may be assumed to have
the qualifications which others are required to manifest as a result of an examination before a
board of medical experts." Id. at 177. See also Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889) (licens-
ing of physicians whose credentials included only practical experience is permitted).
146. See Taylor v. Hayes, 131 Ill. App. 2d 305, 311, 264 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1970).
147 Id. The court dismissed as unreasonable the suggestion of the Department of Registra-
tion and Education that plaintiff earn a master's degree by taking post-graduate courses and com-
pleting an internship 17 years after college graduation. The court refused, however, to issue a writ
of injunction compelling the Department to certify plaintiff. Instead, the court directed the De-
partment to examine plaintiff and evaluate his qualifications without reference to the act's educa-
tional requirements, and to determine in this manner whether he is competent for certification.
Id.
148. 521 F.2d 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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irrefutable presumption that professional competence is related to pos-
session of a graduate degree violative of due process of law. The court
stated that the presumption arbitrarily and unreasonably deprived indi-
viduals of a constitutionally recognized interest in the practice of a cho-
sen profession. 149 Although Berger practiced psychology in the District
of Columbia for over thirteen years, the board denied his application
for licensure without examination because he possessed neither a doc-
toral nor a master's degree.' 5 ° In its reversal of the board, the United
States Court of Appeals described the practice of psychology as an
amorphous, inexact, and mysterious discipline for which graduate edu-
cation may be rationally required in the future. It was irrational, how-
ever, to place such educational requirements on current practitioners
who received their training when psychology graduate education was
"even less meaningful." '1' Due process requires that an applicant al-
ready practicing psychology be given a fair opportunity to demonstrate
professional competence before being denied a license. This require-
ment does not greatly impair administrative efficiency because it ap-
plies only to a specific number of individuals and presents the agency
with a definable burden of limited duration. 52
In Whittle v. State Board of Examiners of Psychologists 53 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court also stressed that grandfather applicants
must be granted a license in the absence of suitable procedures for
149. Id. at 1063.
150. Id. at 1058-59. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the board's decision.
See Berger v. Board of Psychologist Examiners, 313 A.2d 602 (D.C. 1973). The court of appeals
dismissed petitoner's action without prejudice on procedural grounds. In issuing his complaint to
the board and then to the court of appeals, petitioner relied on statutory provisions outlining
proper administrative procedure. He could not simultaneously attack the statute's constitutional-
ity as "one cannot in the same proceeding both assail a statute and rely upon it." Id. at 604 (citing
Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307, 316 (1925)). In addition, the act provides that only one ag-
grieved by a board decision may seek judicial review; petitioner did not allege he was so aggrieved
because he could not claim that the board erred in denying him a license. The court of appeals
suggested two alternative remedies for petitioner. He could continue to practice psychology, and
if criminally charged with practicing without a license or enjoined from so doing, he could claim
as a defense that the statute is unconstitutional. Second, petitioner could seek a judicial declara-
tion in an original action that the act is unconstitutional. M,. at 604-05.
151. 521 F.2d at 1061.
152. Id. at 1063-64. The United States Court of Appeals answered the procedural arguments
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (see note 150 SUra) observing that plaintiff's consti-
tutional claim did not seek to invalidate the entire statute on which plaintiff relied and from which
the court derived its jurisdiction. Rather, plaintiff desired a declaration that only one portion of
the statute as applied to him violates due process. Id. at 1060.
153. 483 P.2d 328 (Okla. 1971).
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proving their incompetence. Plaintiff fulfilled the statutory require-
ments for grandfather licensure, 54 but was unable to comply with a
board rule requiring, as evidence of satisfactory professional experi-
ence, testimonial letters from three to five psychologists licensed or eli-
gible for licensing and personally familiar with the nature of the
applicant's practice. Plaintiff, a solo practitioner, could not produce
testimonial letters because no other psychologists were adequately ac-
quainted with his practice.'55 The board denied plaintiff a license. On
review, the court found the rule unreasonable and unduly restrictive.
Plaintiff's psychology practice was a vested property right subject only
to rules and regulations rationally related to protection of the public
health and welfare.'56 Psychologist licensing acts, therefore, must pro-
vide flexible procedures so grandfather applicants can demonstrate
154. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59. § 1366(b)(l)-(2) (West 1971) provides for licensure without
examination within one year of the effective date of the Psychologists Licensing Act of an appli-
cant who is at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, a resident of Oklahoma, and
a United States citizen. Further, the applicant must have a doctoral or master's degree "from an
accredited institution based upon a program which is primarily psychological or the equivalent
thereof." The applicant possessing a doctorate must have five years of professional experience
satisfactory to the Board; the applicant with a master's degree must have eight years of such expe-
rience.
Whittle had been practicing as a psychology consultant to commerce and industry since the
early 1950's (more than ten years before enactment of the Psychologists Licensing Act) and he
possessed bachelor and master's degrees in psychology. 483 P.2d at 328.
A holder of a master's degree could also be licensed as a psychologist in Oklahoma if he applied
within one year of the effective date of the act, if he "has been eagaged full time in rendering
under supervision psychological services for five years, of which the last three have been in the
State of Oklahoma," and if he passed the examination. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 1362(b) (West
1971).
155. 483 P.2d at 329.
156. Id. at 329-30. The court remanded the case to the board. Id. at 330. The court directed
the district court to retain its supervisory jurisdiction to ensure justice and to allow plaintiff to
continue his psychology practice while awaiting the board's decision.
On remand the board devised an alternative procedure for Whittle to obtain suitable references.
Three psychology consultants from other states who were experts in industrial-organizational psy-
chology observed and evaluated Whittle's psychology practice. They determined that he was only
marginally qualified to practice psychology but did not recommend denial of licensure since they
knew of less competent individuals who were practicing psychology in other states. The board
permitted Whittle to continue his practice, but refused to endorse him by granting him licensure.
Smith, Psychology and the Courts- Some Implications of Recent Judicial Decisionsfor State Licens-
ing Boards, 9 PROFESStONAL PSYCH. 489, 490-91 (1978).
The courts in Taalor, Berger, and Whittle (see notes 143-56 supra) did not direct issuance of a
license; rather they remanded the licensure question to the psychology boards. Implicit in such
remands is judicial recognition that licensing boards have the right and obligation to assess profes-
sional competence. Id. at 491-92.
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their professional competence.157  Grandfather licensure provisions
that presume a need for graduate education to meet competence stan-
dards for psychologists may be unconstitutional; the presumption prob-
ably deprives grandfather applicants of vested property rights without
due process of law.
III. CONCLUSION
State regulation of psychologists may be necessary to protect the
public from incompetent practitioners, but the effectiveness of psychol-
ogist licensing laws is questionable because of the various problems
and issues that arise in connection with the licensing acts. Legislatures
frequently describe the requirements for psychologist licensure in un-
certain and ambiguous terms. Although the terms have survived judi-
cial scrutiny,' 58 vague terminology may result in the issuance of a
license to an incompetent candidate or the denial of a license to one
actually qualified to practice psychology. The promulgation of rules by
licensing boards to clarify statutory requirements serves an extremely
useful purpose. The rules provide more concrete, objective standards
on which to base the decision to grant or revoke a license and reduce
the possibility of a successful challenge by a licensee or applicant on
the grounds of denial of due process.' 59
The procedures used by the licensing agency in deciding whether to
grant, deny, revoke, suspend, or withhold a license may also provoke
charges of due process denial.'60 To ensure that the board acts ration-
ally and in the public interest, legislatures may wish to adopt procedu-
157. Some states have provided less rigid procedures for grandfather licensure. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 34-26-45 (1975) (board may waive any requirements for grandfather licensure, including
the examination and educational requirements, if it "deems such action to be in the public inter-
est"); GA. CODE ANN. § 84-3109 (1979) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 631 (1980) (board may
grant grandfather license without examination to applicant who establishes "to the satisfaction of
the Board. . . that he has received by experience or otherwise the substantial equivalent of [the
Act's required qualifications for licensure]"); OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 4732.15 (Page 1977) (board
may waive any requirements for grandfather licensure, including examination and educational
requirements, if applicant "demonstrates to the board's satisfaction professional competence in the
practice of psychology").
158. See notes 46-61 supra and accompanying text.
159. One psychologist advises licensing boards that the safest way to avoid a due process chal-
lenge is in the promulgation of explicit rules and regulations. Smith, Psychology and the Courts.,
Some Implications of Recent Judicial Decisions for State Licensing Boards, 9 PROFESSIONAL
PSYCH. 489, 497 (1978).
160. See notes 62-79 supra and accompanying text.
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ral safeguards, such as placement of a lay person on the licensing board
or promulgation of formal procedural guidelines for the board.
Legislatures may also find it necessary to clarify the scope of the psy-
chologist licensing acts. There is considerable confusion in many
states, including Missouri, over whether the legislature intended to in-
clude counselors within the scope of the psychologist licensing law.
161
This confusion could be resolved with a definitive exemption clause;'
16
the optimal solution requires the enactment of separate licensure acts
for professions closely related to psychology.'
63
Courts generally accept the legislative delegation of substantial au-
thority to psychologist licensing boards."6 The nondelegation doctrine
is not violated when legislatures properly defer to administrative exper-
tise in deciding questions of professional competence, and where stan-
dards to guide the agency can be inferred from the statutory scheme.
The challenge to Missouri's act reveals, however, that it is prudent for a
legislature to state precisely the nature and scope of the board's
rulemaking power.16-
Finally, where expansion of the coverage of psychologist licensing
acts is necessary, the legislature must provide flexible procedures for
determining the competence of previously unregulated practitioners
seeking licensure. 166 An irrefutable presumption that certain creden-
tials are essential for competence risks a judicial determination of un-
constitutionality.
Other aspects of the regulation of psychologists continue to demand
legislative attention. There is a trend towards amending licensing or
certification acts to require evidence of continuing education for license
renewal.' 67 Furthermore, sunset laws leave some states suddenly with-
out any legislation to regulate the practice of psychology.' 68 The Mis-
161. See notes 80-108 supra and accompanying text.
162. Mo. REV. STAT. § 337.045(l) (1978) exempts school, vocational, and vocational rehabili-
tation counselors from the statute's application. Perhaps this should be broadened to exempt ex-
plicitly all counselors, including marriage, child, and family counselors, if such is the intent of the
legislators.
163. See note 88 supra and accompanying text.
164. See notes 109-119 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 120-136 supra and accompanying text.
166. See notes 137-157 supra and accompanying text.
167. One reason for this trend may be pressure from the federal government as it progresses
toward national health insurance and the concomitant need for greater accountability of health
professionals and assurance of their competency. See HANDBOOK, supra, note 38, at G-36 to -38.
168. As of July 1, 1979, Florida and South Dakota had no laws regulating the practice of
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souri legislature can be commended for taking a step, which was long
overdue, in enacting the psychologist licensing act. Now Missouri,
along with many other states, must continue to assess the effectiveness
of its regulation of psychologists and eliminate weaknesses in its licens-
ing scheme.
Jeanne Fischer
psychology. Their previous psychologist regulatory statutes automatically terminated because of
sunset laws which provide for the expiration of agencies that cannot justify their existence. Al-
most 30 states have similar sunset laws, and Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, and Montana will be
without psychologist regulation in 1980 if their legislatures fail to save it. Legislatures did prevent
the expiration of psychologist licensing boards in Oklahoma and Alabama. The Florida and
South Dakota legislatures refused to reauthorize psychologist regulatory agencies largely because
licensed psychologists could not agree among themselves on the proper standards for licensure.
Again, the debate centered on whether counselors should be permitted to qualify for psychologist
licensure. See Foltz, Sun Sets on Psychology Licensing Boards in South Dakota and Florida, APA
MONITOR 3 & 14 (Sept./Oct. 1979). See also American Personnel & Guidance Association
Guidepost, 1 & 3 (Aug. 1979).
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